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The Constitution requires that the facts that expose an individual to criminal
punishment be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has taken pains to ensure that legislatures cannot evade the
requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury presentation through
artful statutory drafting. Yet current Commerce Clause jurisprudence permits
Congress to do just that. Congress can avoid application of the reasonable-doubt
and jury-trial rules with respect to certain critical facts-the facts that establish the
basis for federal action by linking the prohibited conduct to interstate commerce-by
finding those facts itself rather than providing for case-by-case proof to a jury. As
the Court's decision last Term in Gonzales v. Raich illustrates, such findings-based
statutes are subject to a presumption of constitutionality and will be sustained so
long as the underlying legislative judgment was rational.
The conflict between legislative findings and the constitutional requirements
for criminal prosecutions is ignored in the vast literature on the commerce power,
which focuses overwhelmingly on whether Congress can reach certain activities
(and whether courts can or should impose meaningful limits on Congress's
legislative authority) but pays scant attention to how Congress legislates.
Commentators assume that since Congress 's power to act on the basis of its own
findings regarding the connection between the regulated conduct and interstate
commerce is well established in the civil sphere, it must be equally clear in the
criminal context. As this Article demonstrates, however, findings-based statutes
generate unique costs in criminal prosecutions by depriving defendants of
procedural protections designed to make it harder for the government to send an
individual to jail than to regulate her conduct by civil means. The common
justifications for leaving questions of commerce largely to Congress 's discretion,
moreover, ring hollow when considered in the context of criminal law. Given the
considerable costs offindings-based criminal prohibitions and the absence of any
countervailing benefits, I argue that legislative findings should not serve as the basis
for criminal punishment. Instead, courts should require case-by-case proof of the
facts that demonstrate the necessary connection between the defendant's conduct
and interstate commerce.
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I. Introduction
In Gonzales v. Raich,l the Supreme Court held that Congress can use its
power to regulate interstate commerce to prohibit intrastate possession of
marijuana that is grown in-state and permitted for medical use under state
law.2 Raich is the latest of a series of cases in which the Court has grappled
with its role in enforcing the bounds of Congress's enumerated powers,
including the commerce power.3 The cases are widely understood as cases
about constitutional structure, about the relationships between the federal
government and the states and between federal courts and Congress.4
This Article proposes a different way of thinking about cases like Raich,
one that focuses less on questions of structure and more on questions of
individual right. Like United States v. Lopez5 before it, Raich involved a
1. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
2. At issue in Raich was a provision of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971
(2000), which prohibits, among other things, possession of marijuana. Angel Raich and Diane
Monson, both California residents, challenged the Act as applied to their possession of marijuana
for medical uses permitted under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1991 & Supp. 2006). Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-200.
3. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (holding that the federal bribery statute, 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2000), is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Spending Clause);
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000), is a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to cases implicating the right of access to the courts); Nev. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000), is a valid Section Five enactment); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12112 (2000), exceeds Congress's power under Section Five); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down portions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), as outside Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and Section Five);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994), is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section
Five); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(holding that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271,
296 (1994), is not a valid Section Five enactment); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(concluding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4
(1994), exceeded Congress's Section Five power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994), as outside Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause).
4. For post-Lopez discussions about judicial review on Commerce Clause issues, see, for
example: William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV.
87 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional
Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695
(1996); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Barry Friedman,
Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757 (1996); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress Into an Agency: The
Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731 (1996); and Deborah
Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995).
5. 514 U.S. 549 (striking down a statute that made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within
a school zone).
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criminal statute that prohibited certain conduct based on its presumed effects
on interstate commerce. Elsewhere in the law, criminal prohibitions are
treated differently from civil regulations; we recognize that criminal
punishment is worse than civil sanction and that it therefore triggers distinct
rights and duties.6 Not so under the Commerce Clause. Focused as they are
on federalism, cases and commentary about the commerce power tend to
treat all federal laws alike, ignoring the differences between criminal and
civil legislation. The result is that the protections normally governing
criminal prosecutions have been subtly eroded in the context of the
Commerce Clause. The absence of those protections is felt most
immediately by individuals charged with a crime, but it also has important
implications for the scope of federal power. Yet, as long as criminal
Commerce Clause statutes are understood to present only questions of
federalism and separation of powers, the problem is hidden from view.
At the heart of protections for criminal suspects is the presumption of
innocence. The defendant is presumed not to have committed the offense
charged unless and until the prosecution can prove his guilt to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. Generally speaking, the requirements of
presentation to the jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt apply to every
fact that is essential to the defendant's punishment.7
When legislating under the commerce power, however, Congress is able
to avoid the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial requirements with a simple
statutory drafting choice. Some criminal Commerce Clause statutes contain
what is known as a "jurisdictional element"8-an element of the offense that
6. That is not to say that every criminal punishment is always or obviously worse than every
civil sanction. A very short period of imprisonment, for example, may in some circumstances be
preferable to an enormous, bankruptcy-inducing fine, and the difference between a criminal and
civil fine often is difficult to discern. The claim here is not that the existing line between civil and
criminal is perfect but simply that it exists-that is, that there are some punishments that we as a
legal system take special pains to ensure are not imposed erroneously. Under present law, all
criminal punishments-and only criminal punishments-fall within that category. If in the future
we treat some purportedly "civil" sanctions to the same protections, the arguments herein will apply
to statutes that prescribe those sanctions as well. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO Is a Misnomer: The
Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1288, 1291-94 (1987) (arguing that the civil provisions of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, are punitive in effect and purpose and therefore should be treated as
if they were criminal in nature).
7. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (reviewing recent precedent requiring
that every essential element of a defendant's punishment must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt). In federal prosecutions, the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial requirements are
supplemented by the requirement that offense elements must be charged in the indictment and
presented to a grand jury. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002).
8. The term "jurisdictional element" is something of a misnomer. As several courts have
recognized, "the nexus with interstate commerce ... is 'jurisdictional' only in the shorthand sense
that without that nexus, there can be no federal crime. ... It is not jurisdictional in the sense that it
affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction." United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th
Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 982 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657, 659
(5th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000); United States v. Rea, 169 F.3d
2006] 1205
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establishes the basis for federal power by demonstrating a connection
between the defendant's conduct and interstate commerce. The Hobbs Act,
for example, prohibits robbery and extortion that "affects commerce." 9 In
prosecutions under the Act, the government must persuade the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt both that the defendant committed robbery or extortion and
that his conduct affected interstate commerce.
But Congress is under no obligation to include a jurisdictional element
in every criminal Commerce Clause statute. Rather than provide for proof of
the connection to commerce in each case, Congress can decide for itself that
the activity in question bears the requisite relation to interstate commerce.
That is what Congress did when it enacted the Controlled Substances Act, the
statute at issue in Raich: it prohibited all possession, distribution, and
manufacture of marijuana and other controlled substances based on its own
finding, described in the preamble to the statute, that such activities are
connected to an interstate market for illegal drugs.' 0 Accordingly, in federal
prosecutions for illegal possession of marijuana, the only fact that the
prosecution must prove and the jury must find is that the defendant
knowingly possessed marijuana. Congress's findings regarding the typical
commercial effects of marijuana possession take the place of case-specific
proof of the link between the defendant's conduct and interstate commerce.
Although the difference between jurisdictional elements and
congressional findings is largely ignored in the debates about the Commerce
Clause, Congress's choice between the two drafting models has real
consequences for those charged with a crime, and ultimately for the extent of
federal power. By substituting its own findings for a jurisdictional element,
Congress can eliminate the protections of the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
guarantees-protections designed to make conviction less likely. The upshot
is that it can impose criminal punishment on individual defendants who
would be acquitted if the connection to commerce had to be proved at trial.
And because Congress's judgment need not be correct as to each individual
who falls within the sweep of the statute so long as it is "rational" as to the
class of prohibited activity," findings-based prohibitions enable Congress to
reach more conduct, including conduct that in fact had no meaningful
connection to interstate commerce.
I will argue that findings-based Commerce Clause legislation, even if
valid in the civil sphere, should not be permitted when criminal punishment
is at stake. Instead, a link between the defendant's conduct and interstate
1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999); Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
10. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-890 (2000)). For Congress's findings, see 21
U.S.C. § 801(3).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 45-49, 58-62 (describing the rational basis standard of
review for congressional findings).
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commerce should be proved in every prosecution. The argument proceeds in
four parts. Part II describes in more detail the different options Congress has
at its disposal for establishing the interstate commerce nexus and the
standards of review associated with each option. Part III explains why the
differences between jurisdictional elements and legislative findings matter:
findings-based prohibitions represent a move away from the procedural
protections-in particular, the reasonable-doubt and the jury-trial
requirements-that serve to differentiate criminal prosecutions from civil
cases. A shift from jurisdictional elements to findings-based legislation
generates unique costs in criminal cases, costs that must be factored into any
persuasive defense of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Parts IV and V examine, respectively, the costs and benefits of findings-
based criminal prohibitions. Part IV demonstrates that the purposes of the
reasonable-doubt and jury-trial requirements apply with full force to facts
that serve to establish the basis for federal action rather than to prove that the
defendant did something criminal. Although most federal criminal
defendants could be prosecuted under state law as well, the consequences of
federal conviction often are much more harsh. Moreover, given broad
prosecutorial discretion at both the state and federal levels, the possibility of
prosecution should not be equated with certain conviction. Because the facts
that bring an individual within the jurisdiction of the federal government may
have a direct link to the severity of punishment to which he is exposed, a
defendant has a significant interest in minimizing the risk of error as to such
facts and in requiring that the critical determination be made by a jury drawn
from the local community. Those interests get lost when Congress relies on
its own findings as the basis for prohibiting certain categories of activities.
As Part V explains, the costs of findings-based prohibitions are not balanced
by their perceived benefits. To the contrary, the conventional justifications
for deference to Congress on matters of commerce are unconvincing when
one focuses on the distinctive features of criminal law and criminal
prosecutions. They are plainly insufficient to trump the interests of criminal
defendants.
I argue in Part VI, therefore, that a nexus to interstate commerce should
be treated as an essential element of any criminal offense based on the
commerce power. Rather than relying on its own judgment that the
prohibited activity is related to interstate commerce, Congress should require
federal prosecutors to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in each
case that the defendant's conduct had the necessary connection to interstate
commerce. In the absence of express jurisdictional elements, courts should
interpret criminal Commerce Clause statutes to require such proof.
II. Federal Criminal Law Under the Commerce Clause
The commerce power permits Congress to address three different
categories of problems. First, Congress can control the use of the channels of
Texas Law Review
interstate commerce by regulating or prohibiting the movement of certain
things or people across state lines.' 2  Examples of statutes in that category
include the Dyer Act, which prohibits interstate transportation of stolen
vehicles, 13 and the Travel Act, which makes it a federal crime to travel
between states or to use any facility in interstate commerce in order to
engage in racketeering activities.' 4  Second, Congress can protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or people and things in commerce,
by prohibiting certain dangerous activities. 5  The "instrumentalities"
category includes statutes that target the destruction of airplanes 16 and theft
from interstate shipments. 17  Finally, Congress can regulate activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if they occur wholly
intrastate. 18 Both the Hobbs Act 19 and the Controlled Substances Act 20 fall
into the "substantial effects" category, together with statutes like the Money
Laundering Control Act, which makes it a crime to launder the proceeds of
an illegal financial transaction that "in any way or degree affects interstate
commerce," 21 and the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which prohibits loan
sharking on the basis of Congress's findings regarding the relationship
between extortionate credit transactions and organized crime and interstate
commerce.
22
The three categories of commercial regulations have defined the bounds
of Congress's commerce power since the famous "switch in time '23 when the
12. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2000).
14. Id. § 1952(a).
15. Perez, 402 U.S. at 150.
16. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 32).
17. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 659).
18. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005). The "effects" category has been the
subject of most of the controversy about the scope of the commerce power and courts' role in
enforcing it, in part because-unlike the first two categories-Congress's authority to reach
activities that are not part of interstate commerce but nevertheless affect it derives from the
Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause. See id. at 2208-09; id. at
2216 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A second reason for the
preoccupation with the effects category is that, to date, it is the only home for statutes based on
Congress's own findings regarding the connection between the regulated conduct and interstate
commerce rather than case-by-case proof by means of a jurisdictional element. It is important to
recognize, however, that there is nothing in current law that prevents Congress from employing the
same mechanism in the channels or instrumentalities categories.
19. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
22. Id. § 892; see also Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 201, 82
Stat. 146, 159 (detailing Congress's findings regarding the interstate effects of loan sharking).
23. The source of the phrase "the switch in time that saved nine"--describing the Court's
apparent change of heart in the face of President Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme-is a matter of
some controversy. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 974 n.9 (2000) (describing the uncertainty regarding
proper attribution).
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Supreme Court abandoned its efforts to limit state and federal economic
legislation through a theory of substantive due process and a restrictive view
of the Commerce Clause.24 The Court's 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 5 not only secured the place of the "substantial effects"
category in Commerce Clause jurisprudence but also set the stage for judicial
deference to Congress on commerce issues. 26 After Jones & Laughlin the
Court did not strike down a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds for
more than fifty years-not until United States v. Lopez, in which it
invalidated a criminal prohibition on gun possession in school zones. 27 In the
meantime, federal criminal law had grown in leaps and bounds, abetted both
by the Court's increasingly broad view of what sorts of effects count as a
qualitative matter and by its willingness to defer to Congress on the factual
predicate for Commerce Clause-based legislation.28
24. For a discussion of the Court's jurisprudence both pre- and post-switch, see Richard D.
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994). For an argument that the Court did not actually
reverse its course in 1937, see Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000); and Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal
Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM
L. REV. 105 (1992).
25. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
26. At issue in Jones & Laughlin was a provision of the National Labor Relations Act that gave
the National Labor Relations Board authority "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice... affecting [interstate] commerce." Id. at 30. The Court held that the provision
properly could be applied to employees engaged in manufacturing, abandoning its earlier
distinctions between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce and between sales (which
were held to be part of interstate commerce) and manufacturing and production (which were not).
"The question," the Court explained, "is necessarily one of degree," and courts should defer to
Congress's answer:
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or
unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of
Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and
decide the fact of the danger and to meet it.
Id. at 37 (quotation marks omitted).
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. Discussions of the growth of federal criminal law abound. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown,
Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 799-805 (1996)
(analyzing the intrusion on state criminal law and the marginalization of federal civil suits caused
by the expansion of substantive federal criminal law); John S. Baker, Jr., Nationalizing Criminal
Law: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 495, 502-18 (1984)
(recounting the transformation of federal criminal jurisdiction that has occurred over the past two
centuries); Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two
Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 27, 28 (1996) ("In contrast with the 17 crimes
that formed the entire body of federal criminal law two centuries ago, there are now more than 3000
federal crimes on the books today."); Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An
Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 970-74 (1999) (discussing the creation of federal
criminal statutes dealing with corruption, governmental regulations, and drugs); Robert L. Stem,
The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271,
273, 277-80 (1973) (describing the use of the commerce power to create federal criminal laws
covering wholly intrastate acts).
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Lopez seemed to signal a break from the tradition of deference2 9 and
inspired a great debate over the role courts should play in enforcing limits on
the commerce power. Most everyone agrees that there are limits, at least in
theory; the questions of the hour are what the limits are30 and whether they
are judicially enforceable. 31 The Court's decision in Raich, which marked a
retreat from Lopez and a reaffirmation of deference to Congress on economic
issues, 32 reflects those preoccupations.
Here, the focus is different. I take the substance of existing Commerce
Clause law largely as I find it.33 Thus, I take as a given that the commerce
29. For detailed descriptions of Lopez, see, for example, Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control
and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801 (1996); and Merritt,
supra note 4. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Lopez suggested that the Court was
becoming uneasy with the notion that it should defer to Congress on the question of whether the
activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, at least where Congress did not
establish a legislative record to support its empirical judgment. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63
(noting that "[n]either the statute nor its legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone" (quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 563-68 (rejecting the government's contentions regarding the economic
effects of gun possession in school zones). It is less clear what the Court intended to do about that
perceived problem. Some commentators argued that the Court simply wanted to send a message to
Congress that the Commerce Clause is not a blank check. See, e.g., Guns in Schools: A Federal
Role?: Hearing on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 95 (1995) (statement of Larry Kramer) (describing the decision in Lopez as a "sort of
'signaling device'-a reminder to Congress that the Court is still out there, willing (however
reluctantly) to intervene if federal legislators become too complacent about extending their
authority"); Brickey, supra, at 839 (suggesting that "Congress could (and perhaps should) view
Lopez as a warning shot across the bow"). Others maintained that the Court had in mind what some
have called "due process of lawmaking"-that is, that while the Court was prepared to defer to
Congress's judgment, it wanted to make sure that Congress took into account the limitations on its
power and actually examined the relevant facts. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 4, at 720 & n.130;
Frickey & Smith, supra note 4, at 1718-27. Still others argued that the Court was establishing a
new substantive limitation on Congress's power by restricting the category of relevant "effects" to
those that are direct rather than attenuated. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 4, at 772.
30. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (2001); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921
(1997); Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The
Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675 (2002); Donald H.
Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez:
Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61 (1997).
31. See sources cited supra note 4; see also H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a
Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1999); John C. Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
32. See infra notes 45-49, 58-62 and accompanying text (describing the deferential approach
used in Raich).
33. Distinctions between substance and procedure tend to be slippery, and this one is no
exception. To be clear, what I mean by "substance" is the body of law that speaks to the proper
subjects of Commerce Clause legislation. Accordingly, I set to the side the many interesting
questions about the proper boundaries of the channels, instrumentalities, and substantial-effects
categories. Rather than asking, for example, what sorts of commercial effects do or should bring a
given activity within the substantial-effects category, my focus is on how courts should determine
whether the activity at issue has the requisite effect (whatever that is) on interstate commerce. Cf
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power extends only to conduct that has some connection to interstate
commerce-whether it is movement in commerce, use of the
instrumentalities of commerce, or a substantial effect on commerce. My
focus is not on the character of the requisite connection but on how it is
established in criminal prosecutions.
Early federal criminal statutes all contained jurisdictional elements, so
the facts that brought the defendant's conduct within the scope of the
commerce power had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in
each case.34 Today we have a mix. Most statutes still contain jurisdictional
elements, but others define the prohibited conduct without reference to
interstate commerce, based on Congress's determination that such conduct
bears the requisite connection to commerce as a categorical matter.35  Still
other statutes occupy a middle ground between those two approaches: they
contain both a jurisdictional element and an explicit presumption that
obviates the need for proof of the nexus to interstate commerce absent some
contrary evidence from the defendant.36 This Part will describe the three
options in more detail.
A. Proving the Interstate Commerce Nexus: Three Versions of an Anti-
widget Statute
Suppose Congress wants to prohibit interstate traffic in widgets.
Suppose further that widgets are produced in all parts of the country; some
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1, 51 (2004) (distinguishing
between "constitutional operative propositions (essentially, judge-interpreted constitutional
meaning) and constitutional decision rules (rules that direct courts how to decide whether a given
operative proposition has been, or will be, complied with")).
34. See, e.g., Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000)) (regulating commerce-affecting conduct by
prohibiting, among other things, laundering the proceeds of illegal financial transactions that "in
any way or degree affect[] interstate commerce"); Larceny Act of 1913, ch. 50, 37 Stat. 670
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (2000)) (regulating instrumentalities of interstate
commerce by prohibiting breaking the seals of railroad cars containing interstate or foreign
shipments); National Stolen Property Act, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (1934) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (2000)) (regulating the use of the channels of interstate commerce by making it a
crime knowingly to transport stolen property in interstate commerce).
35. Examples of findings-based criminal statutes include the Consumer Credit Protection Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 201, 82 Stat. 146, 159 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 892 (2000))
(prohibiting extortionate credit transactions, or loan sharking, on the basis of Congress's findings
that organized crime derives a substantial chunk of its income from extortionate credit transactions,
that such transactions are carried on "to a substantial extent in interstate and foreign commerce,"
and that even when such transactions occur purely intrastate, "they nevertheless directly affect
interstate and foreign commerce"), and the Gambling Enterprises Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Tit. VIII,
84 Stat. 936, 936-37 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000)) (prohibiting "illegal
gambling business[es]" based on Congress's finding that "illegal gambling involves widespread use
of, and has an effect upon, interstate and foreign commerce and the facilities thereof").
36. See, e.g., Lindbergh Kidnapping Act, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of kidnapping victims but also
providing that evidence that the victim was not returned within 24 hours will establish a rebuttable
presumption of interstate movement).
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people produce them for personal use, but the vast majority of widgets are
bought and sold, often across state lines. Many states prohibit production
and possession of widgets, but enforcement in the more restrictive states is
undermined by traffic with states in which widgets are legal. In an effort to
facilitate enforcement of anti-widget laws, Congress enacts a statute that
prohibits possession of widgets "in or otherwise affecting interstate or
foreign commerce."
Some time passes, and the federal government discovers to its dismay
that it is difficult to prove that possession of any particular widget
"affect[s] ... commerce." Nevertheless, Congress believes that the number
of widgets produced for personal intrastate use is vanishingly small and that
most widgets bought and sold in intrastate transactions are in fact part of a
well-organized and pernicious interstate market for widgets. Congress
makes findings to that effect.
Congress now has several options. First, the federal government can
continue to rely on the statute as drafted, investigating and prosecuting
widget possession where the nexus to interstate commerce is fairly strong
and leaving other cases to state enforcement. Second, Congress can try to
solve the difficulties of proof by enacting a statutory presumption,37 based on
the findings it has made, that "possession of a widget shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant can establish
that the possession had no effect on interstate commerce." Finally, relying
on the same findings regarding the effects of widget possession on interstate
commerce, Congress can amend the statute to remove the "in or affecting
commerce" jurisdictional element from the statute and prohibit possession
outright.
The first variation of the anti-widget statute is the narrowest; it allows
conviction only if the defendant's conduct almost certainly occurred in or
affected commerce. The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the
37. The word "presumption" has many possible meanings. I use it here to refer to situations in
which the legislature or a court has determined that proof of a certain fact (the "basic fact") has
some effect in establishing another fact (the "ultimate fact"). See generally Gerald H. Abrams,
Statutory Presumptions and the Federal Criminal Law: A Suggested Analysis, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1135, 1135-36 (1968) (using a similar definition of presumption while discussing the improper uses
of certain types of presumptions in federal criminal law). The effect of proof of the basic fact on
proof of the ultimate fact depends on the type of presumption at issue. A presumption might be
conclusive, in which case proof of the basic fact, without more, must be taken as proof of the
ultimate fact. Or a presumption might be mandatory but rebuttable, meaning that proof of the basic
fact must be taken as proof of the ultimate fact unless the defendant produces some evidence to
support the contrary inference. Presumptions also may be permissive rather than mandatory,
meaning that proof of the basic fact may be taken to prove the ultimate fact, but it need not be-
even in the absence of any contrary evidence. See generally Shari L. Jacobson, Mandatory and
Permissive Presumptions in Criminal Cases: The Morass Created by Allen, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1009 (1988) (defining and exploring both mandatory and permissive presumptions in the criminal
law context).
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crime with which [the defendant] is charged,, 38 and the Sixth Amendment
gives the defendant the right to insist that those facts be found by a jury.39
Because the first version of the statute makes the connection to interstate
commerce an element of the offense (and therefore "necessary to constitute
the crime... charged"), the prosecution must introduce enough evidence in
each case to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's
possession occurred in or affected interstate commerce.4 °
The second version of the statute-jurisdictional element plus statutory
presumption-is somewhat more broad. Although the addition of the
presumption would not make simple possession of widgets a crime,
Congress's findings regarding the effect of widget possession on interstate
commerce would make it unnecessary for the prosecution to introduce any
evidence on the jurisdictional element as part of its case in chief. So long as
the prosecution proved possession, the jury would be obliged to find that the
possession occurred in or affected commerce unless the defendant could
present some evidence showing, for example, that he produced the widgets
himself for personal use and possessed them only intrastate. Upon such a
showing, the burden of persuasion would return to the prosecution, which
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct
in fact affected commerce.
Although a statutory presumption might ease the prosecution's burden
in cases in which the defendant did not present any evidence in rebuttal, the
second option is not as attractive as it first might appear. Because the
hypothetical presumption would shift the burden of production to the
defendant on an element of the offense,4' it would be subject to searching
judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has recognized that presumptions must
be analyzed in light of the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
to ensure that they do not "undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial,
based on evidence adduced by the [prosecution], to find the ultimate facts
beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 2  The critical question is whether the
presumption at issue would allow the government to obtain a conviction
without presenting enough evidence to carry its burden of proof on every
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
39. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
40. That is not to say that the effect on interstate commerce must be substantial in the
individual case. Like actual statutes with "affects commerce" jurisdictional elements, the first
version of the hypothetical widget statute requires only that each defendant's conduct have some
effect on interstate commerce. See infra notes 137-38 (discussing requirements of proof for the
Hobbs Act and similar money laundering statutes).
41. Presumptions may "merely shift the burden of production to the defendant, following the
satisfaction of which the ultimate burden of persuasion returns to the prosecution; [or may] entirely
shift the burden of proof to the defendant." County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
157 n.16 (1979). The Court in Allen intimated that presumptions of the latter type are per se
unconstitutional. Id. at 157-58.
42. Id. at 156.
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element of the offense.4 3 Thus, the widget presumption would survive a
constitutional challenge only if evidence that a defendant possessed widgets
would be sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable
44doubt that the defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce.
Congress need not rely on an explicit statutory presumption to establish
the link between widget possession and interstate commerce, however. It can
amend the statute to prohibit the entire category of widget possession
outright, in effect creating a conclusive presumption that such possession
affects commerce. Like the statutory presumption described above, a
categorical prohibition would be based on Congress's findings regarding the
commercial effects of widget possession. In prosecutions under both
versions of the hypothetical statute, those findings would take the place of
affirmative proof that the defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce,
permitting the prosecution to obtain a conviction based solely on proof of
possession.
Although the same dynamic-substitution of congressional findings for
defendant-specific proof-would be at work in both the second and third
versions of the statute, the corresponding standard of review would be quite
different. Whereas explicit statutory presumptions are tested for compliance
with the presumption of innocence, categorical prohibitions based on
legislative findings are treated to the presumption of constitutionality. 45 In
marked contrast to the situation at trial, a defendant challenging a findings-
based prohibition on constitutional grounds bears the burden of proving the
statute's invalidity. Courts review findings-based statutes under the
deferential rational basis standard, upholding the challenged prohibition so
long as Congress reasonably could have concluded that the activity in
question, when considered in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on
43. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 167 ("[S]ince the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt
[on every element of the offense], it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption unless the fact
proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977) ("[A] State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, and... it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that
ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense.").
44. The test described in the text applies to presumptions that are mandatory in the sense that
the jury must find the ultimate fact if the government proves the basic fact and the defendant does
not introduce any evidence to call into question the truth of the presumed fact. See Allen, 442 U.S.
at 157-58, 166-67. Because such presumptions make proof of the basic fact a "sole and sufficient
basis for a finding of guilt," id. at 167, their validity must be tested without regard to the particular
facts of the challenger's case but rather "based on the presumption's accuracy in the run of cases,"
id. at 159. A different test applies to permissive presumptions. See id. at 162-63, 165 (explaining
that the validity of permissive statutory presumptions rests on "an evaluation of the presumption as
applied to the record before the Court" and that such presumptions are constitutional so long as
there is a "rational connection" between the fact or facts to be presumed and the facts the
prosecution proved at trial).
45. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 (2005) (explaining that Congress's judgment
underlying the categorical prohibition on marijuana possession "is entitled to a strong presumption
of validity").
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interstate commerce.46 Congress need not make any express findings on the
issue, whether in the text of the statute or the legislative history; it is enough
that rational legislators could have found the requisite connection between
the prohibited conduct and interstate commerce.4 7 Nor need Congress's
resolution of the issue be correct-and certainly not demonstrably correct
beyond a reasonable doubt. When findings-based statutes are at issue, mere
rationality will suffice.48 The focus of the judicial inquiry, moreover, is not
on the connection between the defendant's own conduct and interstate
commerce but on the features of the prohibited activity as a class.
49
46. See id. at 2208 (explaining that the Court "need not determine whether respondents'
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a
'rational basis' exists for so concluding"). The Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison indicated
that the regulated activity also must be "economic"-meaning, apparently, that it must have some
connection to interstate commerce-and that the question whether a particular activity falls within
that category is one of law for the Court. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000)
("[I]n those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based on the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of
economic endeavor."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (reasoning that the Gun
Free School Zones Act cannot be sustained under "substantial effects" theory because it regulated
conduct that "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise"); id. at 566-67
(indicating that aggregation is available only when the activity is "economic"). Raich weakened the
"economic" requirement by holding that possession of marijuana is "quintessentially economic" and
defining the term "economics" to mean "'the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities."' 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
720 (1966)). Nevertheless, the Court's failure to disavow that aspect of Lopez and Morrison
suggests that the "economic" modifier retains some force, at least in theory, as a threshold limitation
on the aggregation principle.
47. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (dismissing as irrelevant the absence of explicit congressional
findings on the question of whether intrastate possession of homegrown marijuana affects interstate
commerce and explaining that the Court "ha[s] never required Congress to make particularized
findings in order to legislate").
48. Id.
49. See id. at 2205-06 ("When Congress decides that the 'total incidence' of a practice poses a
threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class."); see also Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (rejecting a defendant's claim that the loan sharking statute could not validly
be applied to him because there was no proof that his conduct had any interstate effect, explaining
that if "the class of activities regulated" falls within Congress's power, "the courts have no power
'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class" (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
193 (1968))); cf Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27 ("[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence."). That feature of current practice effectively erases the distinction
between facial and as-applied challenges, removing the traditional means by which courts can grant
individual exemptions from otherwise valid laws. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2237-38 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority's approach to respondents' as-applied challenge). See generally
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235 (1994)
(discussing the general distinction between facial and as-applied litigation); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321 (2000)
(same); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1981) (same). Indeed, Raich
appears to confirm what some commentators suggested prior to the Court's decision-that as-
applied challenges do not constitute a distinct mode of inquiry in the Commerce Clause context.
See Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 Mo. L. REV. 389, 432-33 (2003); Nathaniel
Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge "On Its Face": Why Federal Commerce
Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 161, 175 (2004); see also
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B. Explicit and Implicit Presumptions: The Court's Response
The difference between the judicial approach to explicit statutory
presumptions and categorical prohibitions can be observed in the Court's
varied responses to federal statutes dealing with the problem of illegal drug
use. Congress initially tried to regulate drugs by targeting movement into the
country. 50 The early drug statutes prohibited possession but only as a way to
give teeth to the primary prohibition on importation. Thus, drug possession
was not illegal unless the drugs in question in fact had been imported
illegally and the defendant knew it-which might be difficult to prove.
Congress addressed that potential problem by including in the importation
statutes the proviso that proof of possession "shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the
possession to the satisfaction of the jury." 51
That presumption came under attack almost immediately on the ground
that it permitted conviction without adequate proof of an element of the
offense. The Supreme Court sustained the presumption as applied to opium
and heroin, reasoning that because neither drug was produced in the United
States, proof that the defendant possessed opium or heroin was functionally
equivalent to proof that the defendant knowingly possessed illegally
imported opium or heroinY The presumption was more problematic when
applied to marijuana and cocaine, however, because both drugs could be
produced in the United States.53 Given the possibility that any marijuana or
cocaine in the defendant's possession was domestically produced, the Court
infra note 217. But see Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 873, 929-30 (2005) (arguing that the class-of-activities test for Commerce Clause legislation
does not preclude the as-applied approach).
50. Beginning with opium, and steadily expanding its reach to cocaine, synthetic opiates like
methadone and heroin, and marijuana, the Narcotic Import and Export Act made it a federal crime
knowingly to import or assist in the importation of the targeted drugs, or to "receive, conceal, buy,
sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such [drugs], knowing the
same to have been imported contrary to law." Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1914, Pub.
L. No. 63-230, 38 Stat. 275 (repealed in 1970 and replaced by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-890 (2000))).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (repealed 1970). Congress used a similar approach when it first
sought to regulate firearms by means of the commerce power. An early firearms statute prohibited,
among other things, interstate shipment or transportation to or receipt by violent criminals and other
specified groups, but it provided that "the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any [prohibited
person] shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported
or received, as the case may be, by such person in violation of this [Act]." National Firearms Act of
1938, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250-51 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (2005)).
52. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 408, 415-16 (1970) (upholding the presumption
with respect to heroin); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 184-85 (1925) (upholding the
presumption with respect to opium).
53. Although the Court found that most domestically consumed marijuana was of foreign
origin, that was not true across the board. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 39-43 (1969). As
for cocaine, coca leaves could be legally imported for processing into cocaine for medicinal
purposes. Indeed, the Court found that "much more cocaine is lawfully produced in this country
than is smuggled into this country." Turner, 396 U.S. at 418.
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concluded that to convict on proof of mere possession of one of those drugs
would relieve the prosecution of its obligation to prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
54
Enter the Controlled Substances Act, which was passed shortly after the
Court's decision striking down the statutory presumption as applied to
possession of cocaine. 55 The Act did away with presumptions in favor of a
sweeping prohibition of drug possession and sale.56 Congress sought to
justify the breadth of the new statute with its findings, explaining that "a
major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate
and foreign commerce" and that "[i]ncidents of the traffic which are not an
integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect
upon interstate commerce. 57
The Court in Raich upheld the Controlled Substances Act as applied to
possession of homegrown marijuana for medical use permitted under state
law. 58 The Court was unconcerned that Congress had not made any findings
with respect to the commercial effects of such possession and that the record
of the case was devoid of any evidence regarding the effects on interstate
commerce of respondents' use of medical marijuana.59 The critical point for
the Court was that there is a vibrant national market for marijuana and
54. See Turner, 396 U.S. at 419 ("[T]hefts from legal sources, though totaling considerably less
than the total smuggled, are still sufficiently large to make the... presumption invalid as applied to
Turner's possession of cocaine."); Leary, 395 U.S. at 52-53 ("[A] not inconsiderable proportion of
domestically consumed marihuana appears to have been grown in this country .... In short, it
would be no more than speculation were we to say that even as much as a majority of possessors
'knew' the source of their marihuana."). The firearm-related presumption fared no better. See Tot
v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943) (holding that "the presumptions created by the [National
Firearms Act]" are "violent, and inconsistent with any argument drawn from experience" because it
was possible that many defendants charged under the Act received their firearms from intrastate
transactions or obtained them prior to the Act's effective date).
55. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-890 (2000)).
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (establishing five schedules of controlled substances); id. § 841(a)(1)
(making it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to "manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance"); id.
§ 844 (prohibiting the simple possession of controlled substances). For a more detailed discussion
of the Controlled Substances Act and the history of federal drug regulation, see Kathleen F.
Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1135, 1148-54 (1995); and Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal
Drug Control Legislation, 22 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 586, 605-14 (1972).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3). That is so, Congress found, because "controlled substances distributed
locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution";
"controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to
such possession"; "[l]ocal distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to
swelling the interstate traffic in such substances"; and "it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of
controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled
substances manufactured and distributed intrastate." Id.
58. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
59. Id. at 2207-08.
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Congress reasonably could have concluded that "the intrastate cultivation and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes based on the recommendation
of a physician would substantially affect the larger interstate marijuana
market., 60 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens emphasized that, "[i]n
assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause,. . . the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine
whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so
concluding.",6' He stressed, moreover, that the Court has "never required
Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that
the total incidence of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may
regulate the entire class."
62
The difference between Raich and the presumption cases is striking.
When faced with an explicit statutory presumption, the Court understood the
case to present a question of individual right, not (or not only) federal power,
and it responded accordingly. To be sure, the Court took into account
Congress's judgment regarding the interstate commerce nexus, and it
considered any empirical evidence in the legislative history supporting that
judgment.63 In contrast to Raich, however, the question for the Court in the
presumption cases was not whether Congress rationally could have found a
connection between drug possession and interstate commerce but whether the
requisite connection was sufficiently clear as to permit conviction without
any defendant-specific evidence-that is, whether the relationship between
the basic and ultimate facts was such that a reasonable jury could find the
ultimate fact beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on proof of the basic
fact.6
The mismatch between the two standards for judicial review is even
more remarkable when one recognizes that an explicit statutory presumption
60. Id. at 2208.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2206.
63. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38-40 (1969) (assessing evidence in the legislative
record indicating that most marijuana is of foreign origin); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67
(1965) ("The process of making the determination.., is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in
matters not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace, significant weight
should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull
conclusions from it.").
64. According to Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth Graham, Jr.:
[W]hen [a presumption] statute is challenged, all deference to the power of the
legislature to prescribe crimes is dropped. The Court will look at the statute as a
legislative attempt to intrude on the power of the courts to find facts in a particular
case, applying to it the [reasonable doubt] test rather than the less restrictive test of
whether the legislature could reasonably suppose that the evidence supported the
statute.
21 B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5148 (2d ed. 1977); see also Abrams, supra note 37, at 1145 (noting that the Court has not
deferred to Congress in presumption cases).
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is actually far better for the defendant than a categorical findings-based
prohibition. A statutory presumption is rebuttable; it gives the defendant an
opportunity to make an individualized showing that his own conduct had no
effect on commerce. An explicit presumption also ensures that the jury will
resolve any factual disputes about the presumption's accuracy as applied to
the defendant.
A categorical prohibition is far more difficult to challenge, and it
removes the jury from the picture altogether. Because a findings-based
statute defines the prohibited conduct without reference to interstate
commerce, the defendant has no opportunity to raise the issue of commercial
effects with the jury. Although the defendant can challenge the statute on
constitutional grounds, his argument will be addressed to the judge rather
than the jury, and he will bear the burden of proving that his conduct had no
effect on interstate commerce. Indeed, even if the defendant can prove his
innocence, so to speak, he still may not prevail in a constitutional challenge.
As noted above, the question for the court is whether there is a rational basis
for Congress's judgment that the class of prohibited conduct has the requisite
connection to interstate commerce, not whether that judgment is correct with
respect to the individual defendant.65
III. A Distinction with a Difference: The Gap Between Findings-Based
Statutes and Jurisdictional Elements
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress's decision
about how to draft the relevant statute can determine the requirements of
proof for the facts that establish the interstate commerce nexus. By opting
for a categorical prohibition rather than a jurisdictional element (or a
jurisdictional element paired with an explicit statutory presumption),
Congress can avoid the procedural requirements that normally apply to
criminal prosecutions in three ways. First, in a criminal prosecution the
government must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. In a challenge to a findings-based statute, however, courts require
only that Congress's judgment with respect to the factual predicates for the
legislation be rational. Second, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal prosecution means proof as to the defendant.
Accordingly, in cases involving jurisdictional elements, the government must
prove that the defendant's conduct had the requisite connection to interstate
commerce. In challenges to findings-based statutes, by contrast, courts focus
on the class of prohibited conduct and eschew any inquiry into the specifics
of the defendant's case. Third, in criminal prosecutions the question whether
the defendant did all the things for which the government seeks to punish
him must be submitted to the jury. But the jury has no role in finding the
65. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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connection between the defendant's conduct and interstate commerce when
Congress chooses to rely on its own findings.
As a practical matter, then, a categorical prohibition based on
congressional findings is broader in scope than a statute with a jurisdictional
element. A findings-based statute permits Congress to reach more conduct,
including conduct that itself has no effect on interstate commerce. To be
sure, the difference may be visible only at the margins, in cases where the
question of interstate effects is subject to reasonable dispute. But that is
precisely the class of cases in which the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
requirements are most important. Those procedural protections are designed
to ensure that we err on the side of the defendant when it is unclear what the
"right" answer is or where different decisionmakers might answer the same
question differently.66
The point is not merely theoretical. Defendants do walk free from
prosecutions under all manner of "elements" statutes on the ground that the
prosecution cannot establish the requisite connection to interstate
commerce. 67 As Raich demonstrates, the same defendants likely would be
convicted had Congress opted to rely on its own findings rather than a
jurisdictional element.
Given the very real differences between jurisdictional elements and
legislative findings, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to
66. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 & n.26 (1968) ("[W]hen juries differ with
the result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the
very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now employed."); United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955) ("Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life
bring into the jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. Such juries
may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single
field...." (citations omitted)); cf VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 245
(1986) (discussing studies of cases in which judges and juries disagreed); HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 115 (1966) (same).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing a Hobbs Act
conviction for insufficient evidence of a connection to interstate commerce); United States v.
Turner, 272 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848 (7th Cir.
2001) (same); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Frost,
61 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir. 1995) (same), as modified, 77 F.3d 1319 (1 1th Cir. 1996), vacated on other
grounds, 520 U.S. 1226 (1997); United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United
States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020
(7th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. Merolla, 523 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); United States
v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1965) (same); see also United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093
(2d Cir. 1997) (reversing a conviction under the money laundering statute for insufficient evidence
of a connection to interstate commerce); United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4 (2d Cir. 1996) (same,
for a conviction under Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2322 (2000)); United States v.
Quigley, 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming a judgment of acquittal entered after the jury
returned a guilty verdict on Hobbs Act charges on the ground that the robbery of individuals who
patronized a liquor store did not affect interstate commerce); United States v. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 2d
802 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (dismissing an indictment charging a violation of the Violent Crime in Aid
of Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000), because the allegations were insufficient to show a
sufficient connection to commerce); United States v. Blair, 762 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(entering a judgment of acquittal on Hobbs Act charges where the evidence was insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce).
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Congress's choice among the available drafting models. Commentators have
devoted a great deal of attention to the question of how courts should review
findings-based statutes, 68 yet rarely does anyone ask the prior question
whether Congress ever should be able to rely on its own findings in lieu of
case-by-case proof of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
interstate commerce. There are several possible explanations for that silence.
This Part will examine two of the most likely culprits and will explain why
Congress's power to impose criminal punishment under the Commerce
Clause based on its own findings rather than proof at trial is not so obvious as
is generally assumed.
A. Crime Definition in a Government of Limited Power
If courts and commentators have not attempted to justify the use of
congressional findings in the criminal sphere, it may be because the
differences between jurisdictional elements and findings-based statutes are
hidden by what might be described as conceptual tunnel vision with respect
to Commerce Clause issues. When Congress relies on jurisdictional
elements and explicit statutory presumptions to make certain conduct illegal,
courts (and commentators) focus on what happens at trial; we conceive of
this as an issue of criminal procedure, so we are alert for incursions against
the procedural rights of individual criminal defendants. 69 But when Congress
defines the prohibited conduct without reference to interstate commerce,
criminal trials and criminal defendants fade from view. The matter is
transformed from a question of individual right into a structural question of
federal power, so we are no longer concerned about proof with respect to a
particular criminal defendant.7 °
The perceived conceptual disconnect between questions of criminal
procedure and questions of federal power reflects a similar divide within
criminal law between questions of criminal procedure, which are understood
as the province of courts and the Constitution,71 and questions of substantive
68. See supra notes 4, 30 for a list of such articles.
69. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text (describing the Court's treatment of explicit
statutory presumptions contained in early drug and firearm statutes).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941) ("In passing on the validity
of [findings-based Commerce Clause legislation] the only function of courts is to determine whether
the particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the federal power."); Henning,
supra note 49, at 448 (contending that as-applied challenges to findings-based statutes raise only
"federalism claim[s]" and "do[] not involve an alleged violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights" and that "[flederalism protects the states directly, not individuals, from the misuse of
authority by the federal government, so it is hard to understand how it can furnish to an individual a
defense to criminal charges for violating a statute that Congress has the authority to enact"). But cf
Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 (1998)
(noting critically the "near-complete separation between the jurisprudence of congressional power
and the jurisprudence of individual rights").
71. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (1996) ("Legislatures decide what is and is not a crime .... But courts alone
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crime definition, which are left largely to the discretion of the legislature.72
The Constitution requires that all facts "necessary to constitute the
crime... charged" must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,73
but it does not itself identify which facts constitute the "necessary"
ingredients of any given offense. Instead, the designation of "necessary"
facts and the procedural protections that follow from that designation turn on
how the legislature chose to define the relevant offense. Generally speaking,
a fact is "necessary" for purposes of the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
requirements if (and only if) the legislature treated it as an element of the
offense.74
decide what the law of criminal procedure looks like, since courts are the system's constitutional
lawmakers and criminal procedure is the province of constitutional law.").
72. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) ("[D]efining criminal conduct is a
task generally left to the legislative branch .. "). Although legislatures typically may define crime
as they choose, the Supreme Court has recognized some substantive limitations. For example, the
Court has held that the legislature cannot criminalize mere status but must include some actus reus
in the definition of the offense. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (striking down a
state statute making it a crime for a person to be addicted to narcotics). Similarly, in some
circumstances the legislature must define the offense to include a particular mens rea. See Lambert
v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (holding that a criminal provision requiring felons residing
in Los Angeles to register with the city violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as applied to a convicted felon with no knowledge of the requirement). Other
constitutional limitations, while not specific to criminal law, likewise constrain the power of the
legislature to attach criminal punishment to certain activities. For example, in cases involving anti-
obscenity statutes, the First Amendment requires the government to prove that the material at issue
was not merely pornographic but obscene and that the defendant did not merely possess it but
distributed or intended to distribute it. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (holding that
the First Amendment does not permit the government to criminalize the distribution of sexually
explicit materials unless they qualify as obscene); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment does not permit the government to criminalize the mere
possession of obscene materials).
73. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277
(1993) (applying the jury-trial requirement to the same category of facts as the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
74. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) ("[T]he Due Process Clause requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of
the offense of which the defendant is charged."). That is not to say that the legislature must have
labeled the fact as an element of the offense. In a series of sentencing cases beginning with
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court has made clear that any fact
(other than a prior conviction) that the government must prove in order to establish a prima facie
case sufficient to expose the defendant to a particular maximum punishment must be proved to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 476 (applying the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
requirements to a state hate-crime statute that authorized an increase in the maximum sentence
based on the judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence a fact not included in the jury's
verdict); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (same, with respect to the
mandatory sentence enhancements contained in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (same, with respect to a state sentencing scheme); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (same, with respect to facts that expose a defendant to a death
sentence). The legislature cannot evade those requirements by calling necessary facts something
other than offense elements; what matters is the function that the relevant fact serves in the statutory
scheme, not its label. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (noting that "labels do not afford an acceptable
answer" to "the constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between elements and sentencing
factors" (quotation marks omitted)). But while the Apprendi rule rejects a slavish devotion to
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A consequence of legislative supremacy in the area of crime definition
is that the same fact may be subject to different requirements of proof
depending on how the legislature opts to treat it.75  For example, if the
legislature makes malice aforethought an element of the crime of murder, the
prosecution must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.76 But the
labels, it still depends heavily on the legislature's drafting choices. The rule operates on whatever
facts the legislature recognized as "essential to [the defendant's] punishment." Booker, 543 U.S. at
231 (quotation marks omitted). It does not speak to what those facts must be.
75. The disconnect between the abundant procedural constitutional protections and the relative
scarcity of corresponding substantive requirements regarding what counts as a "crime" has been the
subject of a great deal of commentary. Several commentators have argued that it makes no sense to
attach heightened requirements of proof to offense elements if the Constitution does not require the
relevant facts to be part of the offense. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In Re
Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76
MICH. L. REv. 30, 46 (1977) (contending that so long as "a given punishment is not disproportional
to what the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt notwithstanding the presence or absence of
any mitigation factors.... the mere addition of an affirmative defense, which after all could
constitutionally be ignored," raises no constitutional problem); George C. Christie & A. Kenneth
Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DuKE L.J. 919, 934-
38 ("If the legislature has constitutional power to make an offense out of elements A and B, it is
ridiculous to say that it cannot make another element, C, an exculpatory factor unless it is highly
probable, more probable, or even probable that not -C is the case or that the defendant will be able
to prove C, if in fact C is the case."); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1348-49 (1979)
(arguing that "constitutional insistence on [the reasonable doubt] standard should take account of
the scope of legislative authority over the definition of crimes" and that the standard is
constitutionally required only with respect to "those matters that the state is constitutionally
required to establish"). But see Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions,
Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 188-
93 (1969) (rejecting the "greater includes the lesser" rationale for permitting the legislature to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant on some facts so long as the government constitutionally could
punish the defendant for the offense without recognizing those facts at all). Others have argued that
the existing procedural protections are inadequate or counterproductive without any substantive
requirements to back them up and have proposed substantive theories of offense definition to fill
that void. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1665, 1666 (1987) ("[D]ue process of law imposes on the government the burden of
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the legislature has classified, or
might constitutionally classify, the exculpatory facts at issue as relating to an element of the crime
or to an affirmative defense."); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 335, 341, 371-82 (2000) (arguing that there is a need for a substantive theory of offense
definition and describing one such theory, known as the harm principle); Stuntz, supra note 71, at 1,
29-38 (asserting that "without substantive limits, important parts of the law of criminal procedure
seem likely to fall apart" and exploring possible substantive limits based on mens rea requirements
and the principle of desuetude); Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice:
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1305-06 (1977) (arguing that the
reasonable-doubt rule should apply to all facts that affect a defendant's guilt, including affirmative
defenses). But cf. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1300 (1998) (arguing that academic preoccupation with the need for
substantive criminal law obscures a "quite different process narrative-a story of a Constitution
engaged in a considered and established relationship with the substance of criminal law, but a
relationship founded on understandings of process").
76. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975) (striking down a Maine statute that
defined murder as killing with malice aforethought but placed the burden on the defendant to prove
"by a fair preponderance of the evidence" the provocation required to reduce the offense to
manslaughter, such that malice would be assumed absent proof to the contrary from the defendant).
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legislature has no constitutional obligation to restrict the category of
"murder" to killings committed with malice. It can instead treat all
intentional killings as murders, in which case malice need not be proved at
all and the jury will not consider it.77 And because the legislature is free to
ignore the question of malice altogether, it also can take the more modest
step of deciding how malice (or its absence) may be proved.78 The greater
power includes the lesser. Thus, the legislature can treat the absence of
malice as an affirmative defense, in which case the defendant will bear the
burden of production or persuasion on that issue.79 Or it can treat malice
aforethought as a sentencing factor that will subject the defendant to a
mandatory minimum sentence within the range prescribed by the murder
statute, in which case the fact can be found by a judge under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.8°
Congress's choice to rely on its own findings regarding the effects of
prohibited conduct on interstate commerce rather than making a commercial
effect an element of the offense may appear to be yet another consequence of
legislative supremacy in crime definition. On that understanding, it should
not be surprising that the facts that establish the connection between the
defendant's conduct and interstate commerce must be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt if Congress opts to include them in the definition
of the offense, but that neither the reasonable-doubt nor the jury-trial
requirement applies to such facts if Congress decides to omit a jurisdictional
element. Just as a legislature can prohibit all intentional killings as murders,
the view suggests, Congress can prohibit all possession of marijuana (for
example) rather than limiting the offense to those acts that have some effect
on interstate commerce.
The difficulty with that understanding is that legislative supremacy is at
best incomplete in the context of the Commerce Clause. The precise
boundaries of the commerce power are the subject of great debate, but few
commentators and judges-and certainly not the majority of the current
77. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977) (rejecting a challenge to a New York
statute that treated all intentional killings as murders, making the absence of malice an affirmative
defense).
78. See id. at 209 ("[uIn each instance of a murder conviction under the present law New York
will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally killed another
person, an act which... the State may constitutionally criminalize and punish. If the State
nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment,
we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty.").
79. See id. at 205-06 (rejecting a due process challenge to the New York statute, which placed
the burden on the defendant to prove the absence of malice by a preponderance of the evidence); see
also Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 75, at 1329-31 & nn.8-12 (discussing and citing various state-
law affirmative defenses that place the burden of production, persuasion, or both on the defendant
with respect to particular issues).
80. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibits carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
offense and imposes a mandatory minimum sentence based on evidence of the additional fact that
the defendant "brandished" a firearm).
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Court-believe that Congress can regulate conduct that has no plausible
effect on interstate commerce. 81 That is not to say that current Commerce
Clause doctrine requires Congress to "legislate with scientific exactitude. ' 82
As a practical matter, the rational basis test applied in cases like Raich
permits Congress to regulate or prohibit conduct that in fact has no effect on
interstate commerce. Such slippage, however, is best understood as a
function of deference-a consequence of the difference between a
requirement of rationality and a requirement of truth in fact-not evidence of
a conscious judgment on the part of the majority to permit Congress to reach
activities that concededly have no connection to interstate commerce.
To put the point somewhat differently, it is notable that none of the
Justices in Raich suggested that Congress's power to prosecute possession of
medical marijuana could be sustained solely on the basis of the facts that
would be proved in a prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act.
Instead, the Court's decision rested on additional facts about marijuana
possession and its link to interstate commerce.83 One can debate what sort of
a showing is or should be required to justify a federal prohibition, but one
thing is clear: the facts that establish the nexus between the prohibited
81. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-09 (2005) (rejecting a challenge to the
Controlled Substances Act because "Congress had a rational basis for believing" that a failure to
prohibit the possession of home-grown marijuana would have a substantial aggregate effect on the
interstate market for marijuana); id. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress lacks the authority to prohibit "the personal cultivation,
possession, and use of marijuana for medical purposes" because "it has not been shown that such
activity substantially affects interstate commerce"). In his separate opinion concurring in the
judgment in Raich, Justice Scalia suggested a more capacious understanding of the commerce
power, one that might permit Congress to reach conduct with no connection to interstate commerce.
See id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate
commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves
substantially affect interstate commerce."); id. at 2217 ("Congress may regulate even noneconomic
local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce."). Although the merits of Justice Scalia's opinion-which was joined by no other
Justice-are beyond the scope of this Article, one point bears mention: it is difficult to imagine an
intrastate activity, the regulation of which is necessary for the proper functioning of a broader
economic regulation, that does not itself have any effect on interstate commerce (or would not have
such an effect if excluded from the regulation). Indeed, the principal reason Justice Scalia provided
for concluding that Congress's comprehensive regulation of the interstate market for illegal drugs
"could be undercut" by excluding home-grown medical marijuana was that drugs are fungible and
home-grown medical marijuana could easily leak into the interstate market in ways that would be
difficult to detect. Id. at 2219-20. That is precisely the same reason given by the majority for its
conclusion that Congress rationally could have found that home-grown marijuana, if unregulated,
would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus, it is not clear that even Justice Scalia
believes that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to reach conduct with no connection to
interstate commerce.
82. Id. at 2206.
83. See, e.g., id. at 2207-09 (discussing reasons why Congress rationally could find that
"leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would.., affect price and market
conditions," including the characteristics of the market for marijuana, the "likelihood that the high
demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market," and the difficulty in
distinguishing home-grown marijuana from marijuana grown elsewhere).
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conduct and interstate commerce are not gratuitous from a constitutional
perspective in the same way as malice aforethought. Congress cannot simply
deem such facts irrelevant to criminal punishment; they have to be found
somehow, by someone.
Thus, while it is true that legislatures typically can avoid the reasonable-
doubt and jury-trial requirements by removing a given fact from the
definition of the relevant offense, it does not necessarily follow that Congress
can circumvent those procedural protections by removing from the offense
definition the facts that establish the nexus to interstate commerce and
finding those facts itself Such facts-I will call them "jurisdictional facts"
for the sake of convenience 84 -are not constitutionally gratuitous in the sense
that Congress can take them off the table altogether. Accordingly, the
traditional "greater includes the lesser" justification for permitting the
legislature to adjust the requirements of proof is not available in the context
of the Commerce Clause. If findings-based statutes are to be defended, it
must be on some other ground.
B. The Distinctive Features of Criminal Law
A second possible explanation for the failure of courts and
commentators to offer any justification for reliance on congressional findings
in the criminal arena is that they assume that findings-based statutes merely
substitute one finding of fact for another comparable finding. As the
discussion thus far should make clear, such an assumption is deeply
mistaken. Findings-based statutes change the question being asked in a
fundamental way-from an inquiry focused on the facts of a particular case
to a generalized assessment of the typical characteristics of a broad class of
activity-and reduce the level of certainty from proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to mere rationality. As explained in more detail in the following Parts,
84. By adopting that shorthand, I do not mean to invoke the moribund "jurisdictional fact
doctrine" under which courts would engage in de novo review of the findings of administrative
agencies regarding the facts that brought a regulated party within their statutory jurisdiction. See
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REv. 953 (1957) (describing the jurisdictional
fact doctrine); Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DuKE L.J. 1427, 1449 (2001) (describing the demise of the doctrine);
cf Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 91 & n.32 (suggesting that the Court's failure to defer to
Congress in Lopez, Morrison, and recent Section Five cases has parallels with the jurisdictional fact
doctrine). Nor do I rely on the closely related doctrine of "constitutional fact," which provides for
heightened judicial review of facts that establish the basis for the legislature's power to regulate
certain conduct. See Jaffe, supra, at 971. My use of the term "jurisdictional fact" is simply
descriptive; I mean to refer to any facts that establish the basis for a particular sovereign's power
over a particular defendant. My focus is on a particular type of jurisdictional fact-facts that
establish the basis for an exercise of the commerce power-but the category could be drawn more
broadly. For example, the facts that place a particular crime in State A rather than State B are
relevant to the territorial jurisdiction of State A, and might be called "jurisdictional facts" for that
reason.
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moreover, federal legislators and local jurors have very different mandates
and incentives; they are not automatically interchangeable.
The failure of Commerce Clause jurisprudence to heed the differences
between congressional findings and jurisdictional elements is tied to its
failure to distinguish between criminal and civil legislation. I suspect that
most legal scholars, if asked to name an example of a findings-based statute
that illustrates why Congress should be permitted to legislate on the basis of
its own understanding of the commercial effects of certain activities, would
identify a civil statute. As noted above, until relatively recently criminal
Commerce Clause statutes tended overwhelmingly to contain jurisdictional
elements; the first criminal statutes that prohibited conduct defined entirely
without reference to interstate commerce, based solely on congressional
findings, were enacted in the late 1960s. Accordingly, it was primarily in
the civil sphere that courts and Congress tussled over the need for Congress
to be able to address broad economic problems with broad regulations.86
Those precedents were then applied, without much reflection, to the new
breed of findings-based criminal laws.87
85. See Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 271, 273 (1973) (noting that the loan sharking statute, together with other
legislation enacted in late 1960s and early 1970s, went "further [than previous criminal enactments]
in prohibiting all conduct of a specific type, whether or not an interstate connection o[r] effect is
established for the particular crime"); see also NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 34 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that "the broadest jurisdictional
peg in the pre-1960s [criminal] commerce power statutes was found in the Hobbs Act").
86. Think of the paradigmatic cases, the cases that established and confirmed the tradition of
deference to Congress-Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)-all of them involved civil statutes. The possible
exception is United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), in which the Court overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and rejected a challenge to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), which created wage and hour requirements for certain classes of
employees and imposed criminal sanctions on employers who willfully violated those requirements.
Darby is a difficult case to classify. By today's standards, the statute does have a jurisdictional
element-the wage and hour requirements apply only to employees "engaged in... the production
of goods for [interstate] commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (codifying the minimum wage provisions);
id. § 207(a) (codifying the maximum hour provisions). But the Court sustained the provision as an
exercise of Congress's power to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce on the view that Congress rationally concluded that the production, under substandard
labor conditions, of goods intended for interstate sale would affect the interstate market through
competition with goods produced under better (and more costly) labor conditions. Darby, 312 U.S.
at 122-23.
87. In Perez v. United States, the Court rejected a challenge to the loan-sharking statute largely
on the ground of civil precedents such as Wickard, Heart of Atlanta Motel, and Katzenbach v.
McClung. 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971). The Court also cited Darby as support for a findings-
based criminal prohibition, id. at 152-53, though it ignored the fact that the offense at issue in
Darby was defined in part by reference to interstate commerce, see supra note 86. Cf Baker, supra
note 28, at 530 ("Although it interpreted the 'affecting commerce' rationale expansively in
economic matters, the Court generally took a much more restrictive view in criminal cases prior to
1970 when it decided Perez v. United States."). Interestingly, the Court's opinion in Perez suggests
that the only criminal law-specific objection to a findings-based statute would be grounded in
vagueness. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 153 ("[Darby] is particularly relevant here because it involved a
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But criminal prohibitions are different from civil regulations, and there
are reasons to think differently about the propriety of findings when they
serve as the basis for criminal punishment. Consider the advantages that
findings-based statutes have over statutes with jurisdictional elements. First,
if activity Xhas an effect on interstate commerce in the vast run of cases, it is
easier for Congress to make a categorical finding with respect to that
connection rather than to require proof of economic effects in each case.
Second, because Congress can look at the problem holistically rather than
one case at a time, it may be able to discern effects on commerce that are
visible only on a panoptic view. Jurisdictional elements, in other words, may
let some commerce-affecting conduct slip through the cracks.
Neither of those considerations-promoting efficiency or avoiding
underinclusiveness-holds much sway when criminal punishment is on the
line. Criminal prosecutions are not supposed to be easy or costless. 88 The
consequences of a criminal conviction-stigma and loss of liberty-are
different, and typically much worse, than those that follow from an
unfavorable verdict in a civil case. 89  Given the significance of those
consequences, our society has made "a fundamental value
determination... that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free." 90  That determination reflects a critical distinction
between civil and criminal cases. Whereas in civil cases there is no reason
ex ante to err on the side of the defendant or the plaintiff, in criminal cases
the costs of error are asymmetrical in the sense that a pro-prosecution error is
less tolerable and more costly than a pro-defendant error.91 Criminal cases
therefore are governed by procedures designed not to promote accuracy as
criminal prosecution, a unanimous Court holding that the Act was 'sufficiently definite to meet
constitutional demands."' (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 125)).
88. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) ("[T]he interest in fairness and
reliability protected by the right to a jury trial-a common-law right that defendants enjoyed for
centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment-has always outweighed the interest in
concluding trials swiftly."); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) ("Ultimately, our
decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of
criminal justice."); see also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971) ("The fact that the
ordinance [in Lambert v. California, 335 U.S. 225 (1957),] was a convenient law enforcement
technique did not save it.").
89. See Stuntz, supra note 71, at 24-27; see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 134 (1968) (arguing that criminal punishment is different from civil sanction
because it is "imposed to express community condemnation of the original offense").
90. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
91. See MCCORMICK ON EVDENCE § 341 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) ("[I]n a civil case
a mistaken judgment for the plaintiff is no worse than a mistaken judgment for the defendant.
However, this is not the case in a criminal action."); Stuntz, supra note 71, at 25 ("Whether or not
the guilty defendant goes to jail, the victim's harm will still exist; the only injury from letting the
defendant off is the loss of deterrence coupled with any intangible harm occasioned by the unjust
result. That cannot equal the injury inflicted on the wrongly punished innocent defendant.").
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such but to "promote one-way accuracy" so as to avoid unwarranted
convictions.
92
Primary among the defendant-protective procedures in criminal cases is
the requirement that the prosecution prove every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. By resolving any uncertainty in the defendant's
favor, the reasonable-doubt rule responds to the asymmetrical costs of error
by minimizing the risk of erroneous convictions. 93 Civil cases typically are
governed by the very different preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.94
And in civil cases the burden of proof may be shifted from one party to
another based on considerations of convenience and efficiency-for
example, where one party has better access to the relevant information.
95
Efficiency and comparative convenience are largely irrelevant in criminal
prosecutions, however, which are governed by rules whose very purpose is to
make it harder to convict than to acquit.
96
Criminal prosecutions also differ from civil cases with respect to the
unique strength of the institution of the criminal jury. The criminal jury has
the power to decide not only the facts of the case, but also the law, by
acquitting the defendant even though the evidence proves that he is guilty of
92. Stuntz, supra note 71, at 24-25; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) ("[B]y
impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of
the accused, the [reasonable-doubt] standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to
the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself."); Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 ("' [A] person accused of
a crime... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental
fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same
evidence as would suffice in a civil case."' (quoting In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 205 (1969))).
93. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 ("The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the
American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("Where
one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden
of... persuading the factfmder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
94. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 91, § 339.
95. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) ("There are no hard-and-fast
standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is
merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations."' (quoting 9
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940))); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 91,
§ 337 (explaining that "there is no key principle governing the apportionment of the burdens of
proof' but rather there are several factors to consider, including fairness to the party who must bear
the burden, the likelihood of facts to be proved, and whether the party is advancing a judicially
disfavored contention); Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 66 (1961)
(observing that in civil cases "[a]ccess to evidence is often the basis for creating a [burden-shifting]
presumption" on the grounds of convenience, fairness, and public policy).
96. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975) ("[A]lthough intent is typically
considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, this does not, as the Court has
long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him."); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469
(1943) (explaining that, in criminal cases, considerations of comparative convenience do not justify
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on an element of the offense).
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the crime charged.97  The trial judge cannot direct a verdict for the
prosecution no matter how strong the evidence of guilt,98 and an acquittal by
a criminal jury is shielded absolutely from appellate review.99 Matters are
different in the civil arena. "[T]he civil jury can be confined to the province
of fact-finding" through the devices of "directed verdicts, judgments
notwithstanding the verdict, special verdicts, partial directed verdicts,
interrogatories to accompany general verdicts, the ordering of new trials for
inconsistent verdicts, judicial comment on the evidence, issue preclusion
based on previous fact-finding, and appeals and new trial orders based on
legal errors affecting verdicts"-all of which are permissible in civil cases
but not criminal prosecutions.' 
00
The same procedural protections that differentiate civil trials from
criminal prosecutions also serve to differentiate findings-based statutes from
jurisdictional elements. Recall the three points of difference outlined above:
rationality versus proof beyond a reasonable doubt; congressional judgment
versus that of a jury; and a generalized inquiry versus an individualized one.
All implicate requirements peculiar to the criminal law: the requirement that
the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the acts for which the government seeks to punish him; the
defendant's right to insist that a local jury' 0 ' determine his guilt; the rule that
a jury's verdict of not guilty cannot be challenged on appeal; and the refusal
97. In criminal cases the jury is responsible both for finding the facts relevant to criminal
punishment and for applying the law to those facts and drawing the ultimate conclusion of guilt or
innocence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995). If the jury returns a verdict of not
guilty, its decision cannot be reviewed on appeal-not even for obvious error. Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977). As a result, juries have the power (if not the right, see Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51,
71-72 (1895)) to nullify the law in the defendant's favor. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging
the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA.
L. REv. 33, 48-49 (2003) ("Because the Double Jeopardy Clause shields absolutely a jury's general
verdict of acquittal from review, the jury has necessarily been given the power to decide the law as
well as the facts in criminal cases.").
98. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
at 572-73 (stating that the criminal jury's "overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused
and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government" and, thus, a trial judge may not convict a
criminal defendant or direct a jury to convict no matter "how overwhelmingly the evidence may
point in that direction").
99. See Peter Westen, Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1006-07 (1980) ("[T]he jury-acquittal rule... accords
absolute finality to jury acquittals... even where the acquittals are known to be 'egregiously
erroneous."' (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam))).
100. Id. at 1013-15 & nn.42-50; cf Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522 (refusing to rely on a civil
precedent holding that the jury's role could be confined to pure factfmding, explaining that
"nonentitlement under the Sixth Amendment to a jury determination cannot possibly be thought to
follow afortiori from [the Court's approval of such a rule in a civil case]").
101. The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury be drawn from the "district wherein the crime
shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also infra notes 133-34 (discussing the
vicinage requirement). The Seventh Amendment contains no such limitation, providing only that
"[i]n suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
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of the criminal justice system to permit potential gains in efficiency to trump
the procedural protections for individual defendants.
The gap between legislative findings and case-by-case proof therefore is
different-and much larger-in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases
because findings permit Congress to avoid procedural protections that apply
only in criminal cases. As such, it makes no sense to say that Congress
should be permitted to rely on findings in the criminal sphere simply because
findings-based statutes are valid, and valuable, in the civil sphere. To rely on
civil precedents as support for the same power in criminal cases is akin to
saying that criminal prosecutions should be governed by the preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard because that standard works well in civil litigation.
Both statements ignore the fact that criminal prosecutions are subject to
distinctive rules designed quite self-consciously to make it harder for the
government to send someone to jail than to regulate her conduct by civil
means. If a persuasive case for findings-based criminal prohibitions is to be
made, it must take account of the difference between criminal punishment
and civil sanction.
IV. The Costs of Categorical Findings: Jurisdictional Facts and the Purposes
of the Reasonable-Doubt and Jury-Trial Guarantees
The decision to permit Congress to legislate by means of categorical
prohibitions generates distinctive costs in the criminal context. By diluting
the requirements of proof, excluding the jury from the decisionmaking
process, and promoting efficiency over error-avoidance, findings-based
statutes allow Congress to establish the predicate for federal action free from
the procedural requirements that protect individual defendants from
unwarranted criminal punishment.
Arguably, however, avoidance of the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
requirements ought not to be cause for concern when the facts at issue are
jurisdictional in nature. Courts and commentators long have struggled with
the sense that jurisdictional facts somehow are different from other facts
relevant to criminal punishment, prompting some to suggest that such facts
can and should be exempted from the procedural protections that apply to
traditional offense elements such as actus reus and mens rea.10 2  That
102. For example, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the early 1980s,
Congress seriously considered a wholesale revision to the federal criminal code that, among other
things, would have distinguished the jurisdictional requirements of federal statutes from the other
offense elements, specifying that jurisdiction was a legal issue to be resolved by the trial judge
rather than a factual element of the crime to be decided by the jury. See S. REP. No. G5-605, at 620
(1977). For a thorough description of the reform effort, see Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal
Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 92-129 (1998).
If enacted today, the proposed federal code reform almost certainly would founder on the shoals
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny-at least as a formal matter. As
explained above, supra note 74, the rule established in Apprendi and confirmed in later cases
requires the prosecution to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that the statute in
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intuition suggests a possible defense for findings-based criminal prohibitions.
Legislative findings seem problematic only to the extent that they depart
from what the Constitution would require if the relevant jurisdictional facts
were included in the definition of the offense. If jurisdictional elements
could be excused from the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and presentation to the jury without any violence to the values served by
those rules, the problem would disappear.
This Part will seek to show that jurisdictional facts do implicate the
purposes of the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial guarantees. Individual
defendants have a significant interest in accurate, individualized proof of the
facts that make them eligible for federal punishment and in a jury finding
with respect to those facts. The costs of a move from jurisdictional elements
to findings-based statutes are quite real, therefore, and warrant consideration
in any meaningful inquiry into the proper implementation of the commerce
power.
A. Incarceration, Stigma, and the Reasonable-Doubt Rule
As explained above, the requirement that the prosecution prove every
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt is designed to
minimize the risk of erroneous convictions. 10 3  Application of the rule in
question "makes essential to [the defendant's] punishment." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
231 (2005) (quotation marks omitted); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[Tihe guarantee that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by
an impartial jury, has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts which must exist in
order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury."
(quotation marks omitted)); id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A] 'crime' includes every fact
that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment .... ). The Court applied that rule in
the Apprendi line of cases to invalidate sentencing schemes that "expose[d] the criminal defendant
to a penalty exceeding the maximum [sentence] he would receive if punished according to the facts
reflected in the jury verdict alone." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 (invalidating a sentence of two years
over the statutory maximum); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 226 (involving a sentence of eight years
and two months above the maximum permitted by the jury's verdict); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 299 (2004) (disallowing a sentence of three years and one month over the statutory
maximum). The rule would seem to apply a fortiori to jurisdictional facts that establish the
interstate commerce nexus, since a connection to commerce is essential not merely to the duration
of punishment but to the availability of any punishment at the hands of the federal government. See
William M. Carter, Jr., 'Trust Me, I'm a Judge': Why Binding Judicial Notice of Jurisdictional
Facts Violates the Right to Jury Trial, 68 Mo. L. REv. 649, 653 (2003) (making a similar point with
respect to facts that establish territorial jurisdiction). Nevertheless, Apprendi is not a complete
answer to the questions of how and to whom jurisdictional elements ought to be proved in criminal
prosecutions because the sentencing cases provide no answer to the charge that jurisdictional facts
are so different from other facts relevant to criminal punishment that the same rules do not (or
should not) apply.
103. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. It is worth emphasizing that the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requirement of proof as to the defendant.
Evidence about conduct like the defendant's may be relevant to the issues at trial-for example, the
prosecution in a drug-distribution case may seek to prove an intent to distribute by introducing
evidence that drugs packaged like those in the defendant's possession tend to be destined for sale.
See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970) (discussing circumstantial evidence that
tended to show an intent to distribute, including possession of heroin "packaged to supply
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criminal cases, but not civil ones, is based on a judgment that the
consequences of criminal conviction-incarceration and stigma-are
especially dire. By reducing the risk of pro-prosecution errors, the
reasonable-doubt rule protects against unfair imposition of those pains.'4
At first blush, jurisdictional facts may not seem to implicate the
traditional concerns about erroneous convictions in the same way or to the
same degree as other offense elements. If jurisdictional facts are relevant
only to determining which sovereign can prosecute the defendant, it may be
hard to see why the presence of such facts would increase the stigma that
attaches to a particular offense. And as for loss of liberty, the relevant
concerns are whether the defendant will be incarcerated and for how long,
not whether he will be in state or federal prison.
In some circumstances, however, mistakes as to jurisdiction can bear a
direct connection to loss of liberty and stigma. It is largely for that reason
that the overwhelming majority of state courts have held that facts relevant to
territorial jurisdiction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Their
reasoning applies with equal force to questions concerning the scope of
Congress's legislative authority under the Commerce Clause.
0 6
individual demands"); United States v. Hamilton, 978 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the
use of circumstantial evidence to support an inference of distribution). Nevertheless, the ultimate
question for the jury is not whether drugs packaged in a particular way usually are intended for
distribution but whether the defendant in fact possessed drugs with an intent to distribute them. The
difference matters: one might conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that drugs packaged in small
bags usually are intended for distribution yet find that evidence of similar packaging is not enough
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular defendant had an intent to distribute, given all
of the facts of his case. Thus, the individualized nature of the inquiry further guards against the risk
of error as to any defendant.
104. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 ("Prosecution subjects the criminal defendant both to 'the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and.., the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction.' We thus require [proof beyond a reasonable doubt], among other,
procedural protections in order to 'provide concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,'
and to reduce the risk of imposing such deprivations erroneously." (citations omitted)); see also
Allen, supra note 75, at 38 ("The value protected [by the reasonable-doubt rule] is the policy of
preferring errors benefiting the accused over those favoring the prosecution.... [T]he interests that
this value preference protects [include] the accused's interest in liberty and his good name .... ).
105. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining
that "the more recent cases have quite consistently held that [territorial] jurisdiction is a matter
which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
106. See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 553 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) ("To establish that
a court acts with authority when it convicts a defendant, it is necessary that it demonstrate its
authority employing the highest standard of proof."); State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555, 559 (Me.
1973) (explaining that the requirement that territorial jurisdiction must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt "reflects the gravity of the effect upon the judicial process and upon the rights of
defendants of an erroneous factual determination of the issue of jurisdiction"); State v. Butler, 724
A.2d 657, 665 (Md. 1999) ("[T]erritorial jurisdiction, although not an element of the crime, is a
necessary and fundamental element of the broader concept ofjurisdiction."); People v. McLaughlin,
606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992) (stressing the importance of the determination "[w]hether any
conduct has been committed which the State has the power to criminalize and for which it can
commence prosecution against the defendant").
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First, and most obviously, a particular act may be a crime in one
jurisdiction but not another.10 7 Where that is true, an erroneous finding with
respect to a jurisdictional fact implicates both of the concerns that underlie
the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial rules.
Second, even if the same act is a crime in both of the relevant
jurisdictions, there is no guarantee that it will be prosecuted to the same
extent. Prosecutors, both state and federal, enjoy vast amounts of
discretion. °8  As a result, one jurisdiction cannot predict whether another
jurisdiction will attempt to prosecute the defendant at all, and-if so-how
the defendant will be charged, whether he will be permitted to plead to a
lesser charge, and so on.
Third, even if one could predict that the same offense would be
prosecuted the same way in both jurisdictions, the degree of loss of liberty
and stigma resulting from conviction might be quite different. 0 9 It is well
known, for example, that the federal government attaches far more severe
penalties to drug offenses than do many states. 01 The drug statutes are not
outliers; federal sentences generally tend to be longer than state sentences for
equivalent crimes. 11' Indeed, the likelihood of receiving any sentence of
107. Although the majority of federal offenses also are prohibited under state law, see infra
note 177 and accompanying text, that is not always the case. Raich is an example of a case where
the conduct in question was prohibited under federal law but legal in the state in which it occurred.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2199-3000 (2005) (explaining that the respondents'
possession of medical marijuana was permitted under California state law).
108. See AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (1998) ("The selection
of which crimes to investigate and prosecute ... requires a decisionmaking process which reflects
highly selective prioritizing by investigative agencies and federal prosecutors."); Dennis E. Curtis,
The Effect of Federalization on the Defense Function, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
85, 88 (1996) ("In practice, individual United States Attorneys differ widely both in the selection of
offenders to prosecute and in the choice of which crimes to charge."); Donald A. Dripps,
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 1155 (2005) (discussing prosecutors' charging discretion).
109. The error-minimization goal of the reasonable-doubt rule applies not only to questions of
guilt versus innocence but also to questions of degree-more stigma, longer incarceration. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 ("[W]e have made clear beyond peradventure that Winship's due process
and associated jury protections extend, to some degree, to determinations that [go] not to a
defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence." (quotation marks
omitted)); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) ("The safeguards of due process are not
rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have been reached that would
stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty.").
110. In 2002, the most recent year for which comprehensive data is available, the average drug
sentence in state court was 32 months, while the average sentence in federal court was 76 months.
MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 3 tbl. (2004) [hereinafter DOJ, FELONY SENTENCES]. The
numbers are even more striking when one compares sentences for drug possession: an average of 22
months in state court versus an average of 79 months in federal court. See id.
111. In 2002, the average sentence for a felon convicted in state court was 36 months; the
average sentence for a felony conviction in federal court was 58 months. See id.; see also
Ashdown, supra note 28, at 811 ("Due to the federal sentencing guidelines, defendants in federal
court are treated much more harshly than their counterparts charged under state law, even though
the nature of the crimes are identical."); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of
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incarceration is significantly greater in federal court than it is in state court.112
And the collateral consequences of a federal offense-such as the loss of the
right to vote, to serve on a jury, to hold public office, or to possess
firearms-may in some instances be worse than those associated with an
equivalent offense under state law.' 
3
Even when the same act could give rise to prosecution and exposure to
similar sentences in state or federal court, a federal conviction may carry a
greater stigma. Federal statutes often are passed because of a perception that
a particular crime is particularly serious or morally blameworthy."
14
Similarly, "the public may think federal defendants are worse" than state
offenders because "[i]n other fields, federal intervention often signals that a
case is particularly important."'"15 It therefore is "natural for the public to
think that, if the federal government prosecutes five percent of all felonies,
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1312-13 & nn.170-72 (2005) (discussing the disparity
between state and federal sentences). Moreover, the available evidence suggests that a key factor in
federal prosecutors' decisions whether to prosecute a given offense federally is whether state or
federal law carries the higher sentence. See Brickey, supra note 56, at 1163--64 (discussing the
Justice Department's policy and noting that "[p]rosecutors may be making decisions on the basis of
which jurisdiction will put the defendant in the most disadvantageous position").
112. In 2002, the proportion of state defendants sentenced to prison was 41%, compared to 75%
of defendants in federal court. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING:
WITH TRENDS 1982-2002, at 12 fig.3 (2005); DOJ, FELONY SENTENCES, supra note 110, at 3 tbl.
The numbers are closer for felony convictions: 69% of state felons were sentenced to incarceration
in 2002, compared with 83% of felons convicted in federal court. See DOJ, FELONY SENTENCES,
supra note 110, at 3 tbl.
113. The collateral consequences that attach to a federal felony conviction typically mirror
those that would attach to an equivalent state conviction because both federal and state laws
imposing such consequences tend not to distinguish between federal and state convictions. See,
e.g., FLA. CONST. ART. VI § 4 ("No person convicted of a felony.., shall be qualified to vote or
hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."); 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000)
(providing that a conviction in federal or state court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year disqualifies an individual from serving on a federal grand or petit jury if "his
civil rights have not been restored"); 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20), 92 2 (g)(1) (2000) (prohibiting firearm
possession by anyone convicted in "any court" of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year unless he "has been pardoned or has had his civil rights restored"). The difference
between a federal and state conviction is in how long those consequences apply, which in turn
depends on the mechanisms available for restoration of a convicted felon's civil rights. The only
way to restore civil rights after a federal felony conviction is to obtain a presidential pardon. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON
CONVICTION, http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/collateral consequences.pdf. Although twelve states
follow a similar procedure (requiring a pardon from the Governor), others have a more streamlined
administrative procedure for restoration of civil rights, and still others automatically restore civil
rights to convicted felons upon the completion of their sentences. See id.
114. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 108, at 15 ("Observers have recognized that a crime being
considered for federalization is often 'regarded as appropriately federal because it is serious .... ');
William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 147 (1998) (noting the common perception that to federalize an issue is to
recognize its importance); cf William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 531-32 (2001) (describing the genesis of the federal car-jacking statute, 29
U.S.C. § 2119 (2004), and explaining that federal legislators can generate significant political
returns from such "symbolic legislation" aimed at crimes that have captured the public's attention).
115. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 544.
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they are probably the worst five percent."' 16  Whether that perception is
correct, 17 the result may be that the facts that establish federal jurisdiction,
although not themselves stigmatizing, expose the defendant to greater stigma
simply by virtue of converting the crime into a federal offense. 1
8
Thus, criminal defendants have a very real interest in avoiding federal
conviction even in situations in which they could be charged with a similar
offense at the state level. Any move that increases the risk of federal
conviction-like the move from jurisdictional elements to findings-based
statutes-registers as a cost to individual defendants.
B. Moral Culpability, Nullification, and the Function of the Jury in
Criminal Cases
The jury-trial requirement also is designed to protect against unfair
imposition of the pains of criminal conviction, but the protection is different.
We do not vest decisionmaking responsibility in twelve laypersons because
we think they necessarily are better-more efficient, more accurate-than a
solitary judge at finding the facts relevant to criminal punishment. 19 Rather,
the jury-trial guarantee "reflect[s] a fundamental decision about the exercise
of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and
116. Id.
117. See id. (explaining that "federal defendants may well be, on average, less culpable than
local defendants"); see also Curtis, supra note 108, at 90 (noting the disconnect between the public
perception that federal prosecutions are saved for drug kingpins and the fact that 36% of sentenced
drug offenders in federal system are "low-level... offenders").
118. It is worth noting that the argument that jurisdictional facts should be treated differently
because they do not affect the severity of the sentence or the attendant stigma is not only
overinclusive-because jurisdictional facts can and often do implicate both concerns-but also
grossly underinclusive. It has never been suggested that the reasonable-doubt requirement applies
only when a particular number of prison years is on the line, such that it can be ignored when, for
example, the defendant is already facing a life sentence. Nor has anyone seriously argued that the
requirement applies only to those offense elements that affect the defendant's moral
blameworthiness. Countless state and federal statutes prohibit conduct that few people think of as
"criminal" in the same sense as common law offenses such as robbery, murder, and the like. Such
statutes create what are commonly known as "regulatory offenses," Baker, supra note 28, at 538,
and prohibit conduct ranging from failing to keep accurate records of the wages paid to one's
employees, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (2000), to tearing the tag off a mattress, 15 U.S.C. § 70c (2000).
One might debate whether such offenses should be subject to criminal penalties. But where they
are, there is no question that their elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, even though
a conviction for such an offense rarely is particularly stigmatizing. See Baker, supra note 28, at
538-39 ("While it may be 'criminal' to violate the Fair Labor Standards Act, such a violation is not
generally thought of as a 'crime.' It lacks the moral turpitude of a crime such as fraud.").
119. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (recognizing that "in some cases jury
factfinding may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants"); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that "the jury-trial
guarantee ... has never been efficient"); see also David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited:
Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 97 n.78
(1995) (noting that "[n]either efficiency nor technical accuracy provide a rationale for reliance on
juries").
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liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. 12 °  The jury
provides a mechanism for interposing "the people" between the individual
accused and the power of government.' 21  Thus, the individual cannot be
convicted simply because the government and its officials believe he should
be punished; he "can forfeit his liberty... only at the hands of those who,
unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what
they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community
from which they came.'
122
Given that jurisdictional facts determine whether the defendant falls
within the power of the prosecuting sovereign, such facts plainly implicate
the purpose of the jury-trial guarantee. That is so even if jurisdictional facts
do not implicate the defendant's moral culpability. 123  A good number of
crimes (both state and federal) involve conduct that few people consider to
be morally culpable at all. 24 There is a rich debate over whether morally
120. Carella v. California, 491 U.S, 263, 268 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purpose
of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense
judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in
preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge."); Duncan,
391 U.S. at 155 ("A right to jury trial is guaranteed to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government.").
121. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) ("Just as
suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary."); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)
("[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation
and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence."); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L. REv. 641, 682 (1996) ("At
root, jury trials were, in Thomas Jefferson's words, 'trials by the people themselves."' (quoting a
letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1788-89, at 676, 678 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958))).
122. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.).
123. A distinction between guilt in a formal sense and guilt in a moral sense was at the heart of
the efforts at federal code reform described above. See supra note 102; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON
REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 103 cmt. (1971)
("Jurisdiction is not an element of an offense .... because jurisdiction goes only to the power of a
government to prosecute. Whether or not it is proper for the federal government to prosecute is a
separate question from whether or not the defendant has done something criminal."); Roger A.
Pauley, An Analysis of Some Aspects of Jurisdiction Under S. 1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 475, 480 (1978) ("[T]he fundamental purpose of the jury trial
guarantee ... does not require the jury to determine all factual issues in a criminal case .... The
jury instead plays an indispensable role, for constitutional purposes, only in the determination of
guilt."). But see AM. BAR ASS'N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY REGARDING S. 1-THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (94TH CONGRESS) 3-4 (1975) (arguing that the proposed
revision would have infringed on the jury's constitutional responsibilities); John Quigley, The
Federal Criminal Code Revision Plan: An Epitaph for the Well-Buried Dead, 47 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 459,464 (1978) (same).
124. See supra note 118; cf Bilionis, supra note 75, at 1280-82 (noting that criminal law often
"sacrifices moral precision" and that cases involving strict liability offenses "leave considerably less
room for moral input from lay jurors" and instead confine the jury's role "to determining whether
the conduct and circumstantial elements of the offense are satisfied").
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innocent conduct should give rise to criminal penalties,1 25 but where jail time
is at stake no one believes that juries should be removed from the picture
simply because resolution of the facts in question does not require moral
judgment. 26  The purpose of the jury is not to determine whether the
defendant did something criminal but to determine whether he did the
particular act or acts that expose him to a particular criminal punishment.
27
Just as jurors usefully can bring their common-sense judgment to bear
on questions relevant to whether the defendant qualifies for a sentence
enhancement, 28 they can offer a distinct viewpoint with respect to whether
the defendant's conduct was sufficient to bring it within an area of federal
concern.129  Local jurors, after all, may be more sensitive to federal
overreaching than are federal judges. The point is amplified if one compares
local jurors to federal legislators. The comparison rarely is made since most
disputes about the jury-trial guarantee involve the division of labor between
judges and juries; findings-based statutes are unique in the sense that they
substitute the judgment of Congress for that of juries on the factual predicate
for federal action. But that move is if anything more troubling than a shift
from jury to judge. The jury is set up as a check against governmental
overreaching precisely because we recognize that legislatures-both state
and federal-often pass broad laws whose application in individual cases
125. See generally John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Moral Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999).
126. It is not immediately clear, moreover, that jurisdictional facts are morally irrelevant.
Consider the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2004), which prohibits knowingly transporting a stolen
car across state lines. One might plausibly take the view that interstate movement is an additional
moral wrong since it suggests an attempt to avoid detection and prosecution,
127. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306-07 (2004) ("The jury could not function as
circuitbreaker in the [government's] machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a
determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a
judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the [government] actually seeks to punish.").
128. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-85 (2000) (describing the jury's historical
role in finding facts that expose the defendant to a higher degree of punishment).
129. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("The framers of the constitutions
strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary
action.... If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it."); Barkow, supra note 97,
at 58 (describing the Framers' concern that "judges would favor the government over the people
themselves" because, "in order to be nominated and confirmed, federal judges would have to be
well-connected to government officials" and "would not necessarily have any connection to the
community in which they would sit"); cf Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on
Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 553, 571-82 (1998) (discussing factors that can distort judges' decisionmaking as
compared to jurors'); Anne Bowin Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice,
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1389 (1994) ("[F]act-finding requires more than objective assessment of
the evidence presented-the fact-finder must select between or among competing perspectives, a
task that engages the fact-finder's personal perspectives. A jury, which represents a range of
perspectives, may perform the nonobjective aspect of fact-finding more effectively than a judge."
(citation omitted)).
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may be unjust. 130  Judges are an imperfect protection against that danger
because they too are officers of the government. 131 Nevertheless, both judges
and juries have an advantage over legislators in the sense that they look at the
question of desert one case at a time, translating a general judgment into one
tailored to the individual circumstances of each defendant. By eliminating
that case-by-case assessment of jurisdictional facts, findings-based statutes
eliminate a potent protection against the tendency toward excessive
criminalization.
Indeed, the jury is particularly well-suited to guard against federal
overreaching. One of the core purposes of the institution of the criminal jury
is to apply the conscience of the local community to the question of the
defendant's guilt. 132 To that end, the Sixth Amendment requires that the jury
in a criminal case be drawn from the "district wherein the crime shall have
been committed."'133 It ensures that the law will be filtered not only through
"the people" but through a particular subset of the polity: the local
community. 134  Requiring local juries to find a connection between the
130. See, e.g., HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 66, at 155 ("Because lawmakers cannot anticipate
every set of circumstances, it is up to the jury to adjust the general rule of law to the justice of the
specific case."); John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE
SOC'Y 166, 170 (1929) ("The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to
the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular
satisfaction is preserved.").
131. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 32 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasizing that judges "are officers of the Government, and hence proper
objects of that healthy suspicion of the power of government which possessed the Framers and is
embodied in the Constitution").
132. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 97, at 59 ("The jury possesses the power to elaborate the
governing norms underlying criminal laws from the perspective of the community .... "); Steven A.
Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1658
(2000) ("Local jurors stamp the community's judgment on the verdict, permit the trial to serve as an
outlet for community concern, and interpret ambiguous statutory terms in light of the common sense
of the community. These essential jury functions were understood by the Founders ...."); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4, 31 & n. 110
(2001) (describing John Adams's view that "the jury was the 'Voice of the People,' the community
personified to render judgment in a particular case"); see also A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH
§ 3.03(b) (Walter F. Abbott & John Batt eds., 1999) (reporting that studies of jury decisionmaking
"show that jury verdicts mirror local sentiments").
133. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The vicinage requirement is evidence that the jury-trial guarantee
is not simply a promise that the defendant's guilt will be decided by "the people" rather than the
government but also is designed to channel decisionmaking in a way that gives primacy to the
judgment of the community. See Amar, supra note 121, at 685-88. For discussions of the genesis
of the requirement, see Engel, supra note 132, at 1673-91, and Lisa E. Alexander, Note, Vicinage,
Venue, and Community Cross-Section: Obstacles to a State Defendant's Right to a Trial by a
Representative Jury, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 261, 264-66 (1991).
134. The requirement that jurors be drawn from the locality where the offense occurred is not
designed solely for the benefit of the defendant-indeed, in some circumstances it may run directly
counter to the defendant's self-interest, as when jurors from a particular locality are likely to be
more outraged by a given offense than jurors from afar. See Engel, supra note 132, at 1658-60
(citing as examples trials of officers involved in the shooting of Amidou Diallo and the beating of
Rodney King). Instead, the vicinage requirement is best understood as a structural mechanism tied
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defendant's conduct and interstate commerce-to determine whether the
defendant falls within the scope of the federal government's legitimate
interests-puts that protection to work in a concrete and straightforward way.
One might object that jurisdictional facts are unlikely to be the subject
of good-faith dispute and therefore that any disagreement between judge and
jury will be the result of jury nullification. 135  After all, the requisite
connection between the defendant's conduct and interstate commerce need
not be particularly robust. The Hobbs Act, for example, is satisfied so long
as the defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce "in any way or any
degree,"' 136 and courts have interpreted that command to require only a de
minimis effect on commerce. 137  Since any imaginable robbery or
extortionate act will have at least some effect on interstate commerce, the
argument goes, a jury acquittal on the jurisdictional element is more likely to
reflect defiance of the legal standard than any judgment about the facts of the
defendant's case.
There is reason to doubt the claim that jurisdictional facts are hardly
ever in dispute. Although it is virtually impossible to identify cases in which
defendants have been acquitted because the jury was not persuaded on the
jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act and like statutes, the number of cases
in which guilty verdicts have been overturned on appeal makes clear that
there is ample room for good-faith disagreement on what sorts of activities
affect interstate commerce, 138 To be sure, the disagreements tend to center
on the proper application of the legal standard set out in the jurisdictional
element rather than on purely factual questions of what the defendant did and
to whom. But such disputes nevertheless fall squarely within the jury's
to the democratic function of the criminal jury, guaranteeing a voice for local values in each case.
See id.
135. Nullification is made possible by the distinctive rules that govern criminal prosecutions.
See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(a) (2000).
137. See St. Laurent, supra note 30, at 91 & n.167 ("Prior to Lopez, every federal court of
appeals that had considered the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act had found it satisfied by
a de minimis connection to interstate commerce." (citing cases)). Every court to consider the
question has held that the de minimis standard survived the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 711 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848,
851 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (affirming the panel's decision by an equally divided vote); United States v.
Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir.
1998); United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460,
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
138. See supra note 67 (citing cases in which the Hobbs Act and money laundering convictions
were overturned on appeal based on insufficient evidence of commercial effects); see also United
States v. Mills, 204 F.3d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing a judgment of acquittal on a Hobbs Act
charge for solicitation of bribes from individuals because the defendants "had actual knowledge that
the bribe money would be obtained through loans made in interstate commerce").
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"constitutional responsibility... not merely to determine the facts, but to
apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or
innocence."
'139
Though there is scant basis for the claim that a jury finding in the
defendant's favor on a jurisdictional element always will be the result of
nullification, it cannot be denied that jurors may resort to nullification with
respect to jurisdictional elements. It does not follow, however, that such
elements ought to be removed from the jury's consideration. The power to
nullify is the power to correct for overinclusiveness in the criminal law-to
shift the focus from the general to the individual and say that although the
broad terms of the law technically apply to the defendant's conduct, the
defendant does not fall within the perceived spirit of the law and therefore
should be spared. 140 That principle has obvious application to jurisdictional
facts regarding the interstate commerce nexus, on which federal power to
prosecute the defendant turns. In cases in which federal law prohibits
conduct that is permitted under state law, nullification can be a powerful
statement in favor of the state-level policy decision and against that of the
federal government.'14  And in cases in which the offense at issue is a crime
under both federal and state law, nullification may convey the jurors'
judgment that the defendant does not deserve to be punished by the federal
government. That judgment might be based on jurors' knowledge of the
harsh consequences of a federal conviction, such as the widely publicized
penalties for possession of crack cocaine; 142 it might reflect their view that
139. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995).
140. Jury nullification is a contentious issue. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY 61-95
(2000) (discussing the history of nullification and arguments for and against it). While some believe
that the jury's "power to issue an unreviewable general verdict despite the letter of the law
introduces a critical check on the government," Barkow, supra note 97, at 37, others contend that
jury nullification is at best a nuisance, "an unavoidable result of the recognition of two other
important rights: the defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to a jury's independent
assessment of the facts, and the defendant's interest in the finality of acquittals protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause," Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room
and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 446-47 (1998) (citation omitted). The broad
terms of that debate are beyond the scope of this Article. If jury nullification is invalid across the
board, then plainly it provides no reason to distinguish jurisdictional facts from other facts relevant
to criminal punishment. We can therefore assume that jury nullification is valid at least some of the
time and ask whether there is reason to think differently about the issue when jurisdiction is on the
line.
141. Cf JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 109 (1992) ("It is not only in regard to
defining and redefining ambiguous parts of the law that local views are brought to bear by jurors.
Outright jury nullification of relatively clear-cut statutes also normally reflects local feelings about
laws.").
142. Under federal law, offenses involving five grams of crack cocaine generate the same
sentence as 500 grams of powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II), (iii) (2000), even though
most cocaine is imported into the country in powder form, and powder cocaine can easily be
converted into crack. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1258, 1263, 1269, 1273-74 (1996) (providing
information about the importation of cocaine powder and the process by which cocaine powder is
2006] 1241
Texas Law Review
the defendant's conduct was not serious enough to warrant "going federal";
or it might be inspired by the jurors' belief that the federal government has
no legitimate interest in prosecuting local crimes. But whatever the precise
reasons for it, nullification on jurisdictional grounds has a direct link to the
government-checking purpose of nullification more generally.
Like a move away from individualized proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, then, a shift from a case-by-case jury finding to a categorical finding
by federal legislators constitutes a loss, a cost, for criminal defendants.
Defendants have a real interest in a jury's finding of the facts that expose
them to criminal punishment. The benefit to defendants is not simply a
windfall in the sense that involving the jury might lead to more acquittals for
reasons unrelated to the core purposes of the jury-trial guarantee. Instead,
requiring juries to find the facts that establish the basis for federal
punishment ensures that the jury serves its key function "as circuitbreaker in
the [government's] machinery of justice."'' 43
V. Deference to Congressional Findings
We have seen that permitting Congress to prohibit conduct under the
Commerce Clause based on its own findings regarding the typical economic
effects of such conduct has a significant downside. The move from
jurisdictional elements to findings increases the risk that individual
defendants will be subjected to criminal punishment even though their
conduct had no effect on interstate commerce. It also removes the jury-as
representative of the people generally and the local community in
particular-from the decisionmaking process. Those costs are ignored in the
vast literature on the Commerce Clause. Properly understood, however, they
suggest the need to think twice about the propriety of categorical findings-
based legislation when criminal punishment is at stake.
This Part will examine whether the costs of findings-based prohibitions
are justified by the asserted benefits of leaving questions of commerce
largely to Congress's discretion. Because the costs under consideration are
tied to the distinctive protections that govern criminal prosecutions, any
analysis of the benefits of legislative findings must be context-specific as
well. This Part will consider the two most common justifications for
deference to Congress on Commerce Clause matters: first, that "the structure
of American politics" ensures that Congress will not overstep the bounds of
its enumerated powers; 144 and second, that Congress is institutionally better
transformed into crack and also describing a case in which a supplier of powder cocaine received a
significantly lower sentence than two defendants who cooked that powder to create crack cocaine).
143. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
144. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000); see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 550-51 (1985) ("[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States
in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to
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equipped than the courts to resolve complex and far-reaching factual
questions regarding the effects of particular activities on the national
economy. It will demonstrate that, whatever their merit in the civil sphere,
those arguments fail to make a persuasive case for findings-based criminal
prohibitions.
A. Political Safeguards
One of the leading arguments in favor of deference to Congress with
respect to the commerce power is that judicial review is unnecessary to
prevent federal overreaching. 145  That argument descends from Herbert
Wechsler's seminal 1954 essay on the "political safeguards of federalism" in
which he advanced the view that the structure of American government-
including a House made up of members who represent "the people of the
states," with state control of districting; a President elected by an Electoral
College composed of delegates from each state; and a Senate that "cannot
fail to function as the guardian of state interests" given its seniority system,
committees, and the possibility of filibuster-ensures that federal legislators
will not trample on the interests of their state counterparts. 146 In recent years,
several commentators have questioned whether Wechsler's claims accurately
describe the modem political reality. 147 But others have stepped in to update
Wechsler's central thesis for a contemporary audience. Most notably, Larry
Kramer has argued that various overlapping safeguards, including "political
parties, the administrative bureaucracy, the intergovernmental lobby," and
the role of states as the primary fora for political recruitment and training,
work together to inhibit undue federalization.1
48
observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress." (citing, among others, JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954))).
145. The political-safeguards theory has two important aspects, only one of which is relevant
for our purposes. The theory holds both that the framers intended that states' rights would be
protected through politics rather than judicial review, and that the framers were correct-judicial
review continues to be unnecessary because the political safeguards of federalism have proved equal
to the task. The first part of the argument, based on original intent, is beyond the scope of this
Article. For critiques of the original-intent claim, see, for example, Moulton, supra note 3 1; Yoo,
supra note 3 1. It bears emphasis, however, that the historical argument rarely is presented as an
independently sufficient basis for judicial deference on commerce issues. Instead, the historical
claim typically is paired with the comforting insistence that judicial review is not necessary after all
to protect states from federal overreaching. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
146. Wechsler, supra note 144, at 546-58.
147. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 4, at 790-99; Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 860-68 (1979); see also Moulton, supra
note 31, at 911-12 (noting the "remarkable weakness... of [the political-safeguards] claim as a
matter of political science").
148. Kramer, supra note 144, at 285; see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1520-42 (1994) (highlighting the bond between federal and state politics that
results from strong political parties). For a critique of the "political science" aspect of Kramer's
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The goal of the political-safeguards argument is to defend the practice
of deferential rational basis review of federal legislation against the charge
that a more robust form of judicial scrutiny is needed to protect states against
potential federal excesses. As such, the argument rests on a tacit assumption
that legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause imperils only states'
rights, even when it prescribes criminal penalties. It should be clear from the
previous Part that such a conceptualization is wrong, or at least incomplete,
where criminal legislation is concerned. Criminal Commerce Clause statutes
are not only about states' rights; they also implicate the rights of criminal
defendants to adequate proof of facts essential to criminal punishment. Yet
for all the talk about process protections for states, no one suggests that
federal politics protects criminal defendants in a way that obviates the need
for judicial review. To the contrary, it is widely recognized that the interests
of criminal defendants get lost in the political process. 1
49
It is possible, however, to translate the political-safeguards claim into
one that responds to the concerns raised in the previous Part. The argument
would go like this: case-by-case adjudication of jurisdictional elements is
unnecessary to protect criminal defendants against unwarranted federal
punishment because the political safeguards of federalism reduce the risk of
error at the front end by ensuring that Congress does not prohibit conduct
with no connection to commerce. Likewise, there is no need to subject
jurisdictional facts to a jury determination because local interests are fully
represented in the political process.
Faith in the political safeguards of federalism therefore might provide a
reason to entrust criminal defendants' interests to the political process, on the
view that defendants' interests are aligned with-and will be protected by-
states' interest in avoiding overbroad federal laws. The difficulty with that
view is that, as explained below, the politics of crime control give states
scant reason to resist federal overreaching in the criminal context. Far from
muting the accuracy- and jury-related concerns described in Part III,
consideration of the dynamics of the political process suggests all the more
argument, see Marshall, supra note 114, at 149-52, which disputes Kramer's argument that there is
a state-federal interdependence promoting respect for states' rights and instead argues that there is a
strong political trend toward nationalization and the expansion of federal power.
149. See Donald Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice;
Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1079, 1089 (1993) ("[L]egislators undervalue the rights of the accused for no more sinister, and no
more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of persons, of much greater political influence,
rationally adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect
or defendant."); Stuntz, supra note 71, at 20 ("A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped by the
idea... that constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or impossible to protect
themselves through the political process. If ever such a group existed, the universe of criminal
suspects is it."); cf Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor
Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2004) ("[A] prisoner's only hope often lies in the courts. It is
highly unlikely that the majority of people, in their exercise of popular constitutionalism, will act to
protect prisoners and their rights.").
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reason to require case-by-case adjudication of the facts that expose
individuals to federal criminal punishment.
1. Federal Criminal Law Today.-Arguments about the political
safeguards of federalism usually begin with the observation that states have
done fairly well so far without much help from the Court. Kramer, for
example, maintains that, notwithstanding the unprecedented size of the
modem federal government, "the important objects of daily life are still
chiefly matters of state and local, not federal, cognizance." 150 That may be
an accurate description of the relationship between the entire body of federal
law and the entire body of state law. The claim is unpersuasive, however, if
one focuses on criminal law.
Federal criminal law has expanded exponentially in the last century, far
outpacing growth at the state level. At the founding, crime was almost
entirely a matter of state control. The first federal criminal bill prohibited
only actions that infringed on clear federal interests: treason, serious felonies
in federal forts, piracy and other felonies on the high seas, and related
crimes. 51 With the exception of crimes committed on federal land, offenses
against individuals were solely a matter of state law. 152 Matters are notably
different today. State criminal codes have expanded, to be sure. 153  But
federal criminal law is broader still; recent estimates suggest that the number
of federal offenses is larger than that of most states, and in many cases much
larger. 1
54
Whatever the precise numbers, it is impossible to deny that the ratio of
state-to-federal criminal offenses has changed dramatically in the past two
centuries. In the context of criminal law, it simply is not the case that "the
important objects of daily life" are matters of state, not federal, cognizance.
Instead, we have a system of largely overlapping jurisdiction.
150. Kramer, supra note 144, at 227.
151. See Act For the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Apr. 30, 1790, 1
Cong. Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112; DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, at 7-8 & tbl.1 (1985) (describing the
1790 Crimes Act).
152. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996) (asserting that, before the Civil War, the scope
of federal criminal jurisdiction was very narrow and violent crimes "were the exclusive concern of
the states").
153. William Stuntz cites statistics for three representative states, Illinois, Virginia, and
Massachusetts, all of which experienced growth in their criminal codes, expanding from a range of
131 to 214 offenses in 1856, to between 421 and 535 offenses in 2001. Stuntz, supra note 114, at
513-14. Stuntz acknowledges that today's numbers "seriously understate the growth in the number
of separate offenses" in most state codes, id. at 514, but he agrees that "[flederal criminal law
probably covers more conduct... than any state criminal code," id. at 517.
154. One recent estimate places the number of federal offenses at over four thousand. John S.
Baker, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 3 (2004),
available at http//www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/dminaiilaw/rimreportfinal.pdf.
Compare the state figures, supra note 153.
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2. Federal Legislators' Incentives to Expand Federal Criminal Law.-
Criminal punishment is a distinctly, perhaps uniquely, one-sided issue for
legislators. No politician, state or federal, Democrat or Republican, wants to
appear "soft on crime."' 5 5  Indeed, in this age of partisan rancor, crime
control may be the one truly bipartisan issue. 156 While other issues provide
opportunities for uncontroversial platforms-who can't claim to be "for the
environment" on some level?-federal criminal legislation provides a rare
opportunity for political gains with few, if any, countervailing costs.
Industry groups may oppose otherwise politically attractive environmental
programs, for example, but almost no one opposes new efforts at crime
control. 57 The group affected most directly by criminal legislation, potential
criminal defendants, has little political influence. 158 And while groups such
as the ACLU often represent the interests of those accused of crime, debates
about criminal law tend to be dominated by victims' rights groups,
prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and ordinary voters concerned for
their personal safety. 159 As a result, while other areas of the law experience
ebbs and flows, federal criminal law almost always expands.
60
155. See Ashdown, supra note 28, at 794 ("It is virtually inconceivable today to imagine a
political position that does not include a 'get tough on crime' stance."); Barkow, supra note 111, at
1280-81 ("Candidates for office at all levels of government-from the presidency, to Congress, to
state officials-have learned that an opponent's charge that they are soft on crime can be
devastating to their political futures because it resonates with voters."); Stuntz, supra note 114, at
508 (noting that federal criminal law has expanded steadily "under very different sorts of
Congresses and Presidents").
156. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological
and Other Non-legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 43 (1997) ("By 1996, it was hard to find a difference between the positions of
the Republicans and Democrats on crime issues."); Stuntz, supra note 114, at 509 ("[B]oth major
parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label 'tough on
crime.').
157. See Beale, supra note 156, at 43 ("[T]here is little if any political resistance to changes
such as harsher sentences for federal offenders, [and] more broadly defined federal crimes ... ").
158. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 1282 (noting that criminal defendants are unlikely to
expect to be caught and, once prosecuted and convicted, "it is hard to imagine a more anemic
political group"); Dripps, supra note 149, at 1090 (explaining that "very few people expect to
commit crimes that come to the attention of the police" and that "the group of people who might
expect to be targets of police investigation or defendants at a criminal trial, whether they are guilty
or innocent, is largely confined to a small segment of the electorate").
159. Several commentators have described the array of interests aligned in favor of tougher
criminal laws and penalties. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV.
715, 728-29 (2005); Dripps, supra note 149, at 1091-94 (citing police, prosecutors, victims, and
even potential victims as examples of groups pushing for harsher criminal statutes); Stuntz, supra
note 114, at 544-45 (focusing on the disproportionate power wielded by federal prosecutors due to
the increased public attention given to federal criminal cases). For a discussion of the various
factors that influence the public's fear of crime and desire for ever-broader laws and stricter
punishments, see generally Beale, supra note 156, at 45-47, 64.
160. See Ashdown, supra note 28, at 807 ("Additional criminal legislation is more
likely... than repeal of some that now exists; the latter, simply put, would be bad politics.");
Stuntz, supra note 114, at 527-28 ("[C]riminal law expands in different areas at different times and
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The problem goes deeper still, however. Commentators have observed
that criminal law, including federal criminal law, "will always be broader
than ordinary majoritarian politics would suggest."1 6 1  The extra push
typically is supplied by prosecutors, who have their own institutional reasons
for wanting more crimes on the books. As William Stuntz has explained,
"[1]egislators gain when they write criminal statutes in ways that benefit
prosecutors" because prosecutors are the most salient interest group and
legislation that helps prosecutors typically translates into more convictions-
a good result for everyone except criminal defendants. 162  For their part,
"[p]rosecutors gain from statutes that enable them more easily to induce
guilty pleas."1 63  The easier it is to prove an offense, the easier it is to
persuade the defendant that nothing will be gained by going to trial. As a
result, prosecutors tend to clamor for broader criminal prohibitions.'64
That dynamic can be observed in the development of federal criminal
legislation targeting gambling on the basis of its presumed links to organized
crime. Congress first tried to regulate gambling by focusing on interstate
movement. The Gambling Devices Act prohibited the interstate
transportation of any "machine or mechanical device... designed and
manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling,"'' 65 and the
Travel Act made it a crime to travel in interstate commerce or to use the mail
or any facility in interstate commerce in connection with any unlawful
activity.166  By the late 1960s, however, federal prosecutors had grown
dissatisfied with the existing mechanisms for reaching illegal gambling.
Representatives from the Department of Justice testified before Congress that
"many Federal investigations of gambling operations end with no
indictments because of the lack of evidence of an interstate element. 1 67  A
places, but it always expands."); see also AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 108, at 15 ("There is
widespread recognition that a major reason for the federalization trend-even when federal
prosecution of these crimes may not be necessary or effective-is that federal crime legislation is
politically popular.").
161. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 528.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Stuntz illustrates the point as follows: "[A] given crime is defined by elements ABC; A
and B are easy to prove, but C is much harder. Criminalizing AB, with the understanding that
prosecutors will determine for themselves whether C is satisfied, raises the odds of conviction and
reduces enforcement costs." Id. at 53 1.
165. Act ofJan. 2, 1951, 64 Stat. 1134 (1951) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1177
(2000)).
166. Foreign Travel in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises Act, Pub. L. No. 87-228 § 1(a), 75 Stat.
498, 498 (1961) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000)); see Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808, 811-14 (1971) (holding that the Travel Act applied to an operator of a gambling
establishment if he, or his agents or employees, traveled across state lines in furtherance of an
illegal activity, but not if only his customers traveled interstate in order to place bets).
167. S. REp. No. 91-617, at 72 (1969) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting the DOJ's statement at the
hearings). Federal prosecutors also complained that the limits of existing law hindered
investigations because it could be difficult at the investigatory stage to show an interstate
connection, as was required in order to obtain a search warrant based on a probable cause to believe
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broader prohibition that "eliminat[ed] the requirement that an interstate
element be proved in each case" would solve that problem, they explained,
offering both "a promise of conserving investigative manpower requirements
and an opportunity of concluding successfully investigations that have been
thwarted in the past and cases that have not been subject to prosecution in
Federal courts for lack of proof of a specific interstate aspect."
1 68
Congress responded with the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,169
which prohibited all "illegal gambling business[es]."' 17  Gone was the
jurisdictional element that had hampered investigation and prosecution under
prior law. Instead, the new Act relied on congressional findings to establish
the basis for federal jurisdiction as a categorical matter. Congress had
determined that "illegal gambling involves widespread use of, and has an
effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities thereof."171  In
prosecutions under the Act, that finding would operate as a proxy for a case-
specific showing that the defendant's gambling activities affected interstate
commerce.
It is easy to understand why Congress acceded to prosecutors' requests
for a broader prohibition on gambling. Although, by its terms, the new
statute applied to a huge portion of gambling activity nationwide, Congress
did not have to worry that it would overwhelm federal prosecutors, courts,
and prisons. Federal prosecutors are under no obligation to prosecute every
act that falls under a given statute, 72 and their "[e]nforcement discretion
dramatically changes the trade-offs legislators face when defining crimes.'
173
Especially at the federal level, legislators know that very few potential
offenses will be prosecuted. 174  Because they do not need to balance the
that federal law was being violated. Id.; see also Brickey, supra note 28, at 33 ("[l]nvestigations of
large gambling operations often foundered because the government could prove an interstate nexus
with the gambling activities of only a few of the many participants.").
168. S. REP. No. 91-617, at 72 (1969) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the DOJ's testimony).
169. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. VIII, 84 Stat. 936 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(2000)).
170. The prohibited businesses are defined as gambling businesses that violate state or local
law, "involve[] five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or
part of such business," and "ha[ve] been or remain[] in substantially continuous operation for a
period in excess of thirty days or [have] a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955(b)(1)(ii)-(iii).
171. § 801, 84 Stat. at 936.
172. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 108, at 33 ("A federal prosecutor is under no legal
requirement to state why any particular defendant has been selected to be prosecuted in the federal
system and receive a significant federal sentence, and why the many other similar defendants are
left to state prosecution. Restraint is essentially left to self-imposed prosecutorial discretion.");
Stuntz, supra note 114, at 543 ("United States Attorneys' offices, together with enforcement
agencies like the FBI, have the power to set their own agendas, to decide what cases they wish to
spend time on and what cases they wish to ignore.").
173. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 547.
174. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 108, at 19 ("[Flederal prosecutions comprise less than 5%
of all the prosecutions in the nation. The other 95% are state and local prosecutions."). In 2002,
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benefits of new criminal legislation against the risk of criminalizing too
much, federal legislators "will tend to see criminal law as a one-way
ratchet."1 75
3. States' Incentives to Resist the Expansion of Federal Criminal
Law.-Given that federal legislators have strong incentives to expand federal
criminal law as far as possible, the key question is whether adequate political
safeguards exist to provide a check. The answer is no, for the simple reason
that states rarely have cause to oppose new federal enactments. 76  Federal
criminal law supplements rather than supplants state law, and most federal
crimes are crimes under state law as well. 7 7  If the public demands a
governmental solution to some crime-related problem, both the state and
federal governments can respond, and legislators at both levels can reap
political rewards for getting tough on crime and outlawing fearsome
behavior. Nothing is lost, from the states' perspective, as a result of the
duplicative federal prohibition. 7 8  The states still do most law enforcement,
federal convictions accounted for 5.7% of all felony convictions. See DOJ, FELONY SENTENCES,
supra note 110, at 3 tbl.
175. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 547; accord Dripps, supra note 149, at 1090 ("Executive
discretion... operates as an important shock-absorber that protects legislatures from hostile
reaction to law enforcement operations.").
176. That problem is not unique to criminal law. As others have recognized, where there is
"pork" to be had from the federal government-whether in the form of farm subsidies, defense
contracts, protection from hazardous waste, or any of countless other examples--state legislators
often will be eager to get it for the benefit of their own constituents. See Calabresi, supra note 4, at
797-98; Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARv. L. REV.
915, 940-42 (2005); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism?
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (1997) ("Although
those who represent or work for states and localities may be concerned with empowering
subnational governments, they will also feel other pressures-programmatic needs, the influence of
private interest groups, ambitions to serve in higher levels of government."); John 0. McGinnis &
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99
Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 89 (2004) (arguing that "[t]he structure of federalism ... must be protected
against the machinations of both federal and state officials" because of the "possibility that
principal-agent problems will arise in the maintenance of federalism when the interests of elected
officials diverge from those of ordinary citizens"); cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182
(1992) ("[P]owerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from
the federal structure to be in their personal interests."). That will not always be the case, however;
where possible, state legislators likely will prefer to maximize their political rewards by taking
credit for services for themselves. See Kramer, supra note 144, at 223-24 (explaining that, absent
political safeguards to counteract the tendency, federal and state legislators would have incentives to
act as rivals rather than allies as they vie for the support and gratitude of local constituents).
Generally speaking, therefore, the most that can be said is that states will not always play their
intended role in the political-safeguards game. Matters are more stark in the arena of criminal law,
where state acquiescence in the exercise of federal power is likely to be the norm rather than the
exception.
177. See Ashdown, supra note 28, at 793-94; Curtis, supra note 108, at 87.
178. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DuKE L.J. 1169, 1195 n.107 (2001) ("When it comes to the federalization
of crime .... state governments have little interest in speaking up on behalf of criminal
defendants."); cf Litman & Greenberg, supra note 30, at 970 (arguing that federal statutes that
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prosecuting more than ninety percent of all crimes. 179  So federal criminal
law does not steal any meat and potatoes from state prosecutors and police
chiefs, most of whom are elected. 1
80
Not only are state law enforcement personnel unlikely to mind
overlapping federal jurisdiction, they may welcome it: given that federal
sentences tend to be higher than state sentences,'18  the threat of federal
prosecution is a valuable bargaining tool for state prosecutors seeking a
guilty plea. 182 And state prosecutors have powerful incentives to get as many
guilty pleas as possible.'83
States are unlikely to cry foul even in the relatively rare instances where
federal criminal law exceeds the scope of state law. State law may be
narrower than federal law for a host of reasons unrelated to any state interest
in encouraging-or even simply permitting-the conduct in question. For
example, a state may decriminalize activities not because it deems them
blameless but because its limited resources are better spent elsewhere.' 84 In
duplicate state-law prohibitions do not implicate federalism concerns because they "do not preempt
state legislation and generate relatively few prosecutions (and those mostly in cooperation with state
authorities)").
179. See supra note 174. It is important to recognize that the scope of federal law matters even
if it largely overlaps with state law and even if it is enforced relatively rarely. First, the fact that
prosecutions are rare matters not at all to those defendants who actually are prosecuted federally.
Second, the existence of a federal criminal prohibition will have some deterrent effect even if the
law is seldom enforced. Indeed, one of the reasons federal offenses tend to carry higher sentences
than equivalent state offenses is to counteract the rarity of federal enforcement: the idea is that
potential offenders will take into account not only the risk of prosecution but the potential cost of
conviction and will decide to obey the law. See Barkow, supra note 111, at 1305-06. Third, the
breadth of federal criminal law has tangible consequences for criminal defendants even where it
does not result in prosecution because state prosecutors can use the threat of federal prosecution to
induce a plea to state charges. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. Finally, and perhaps
most important, the presence of overlapping federal legislation may retard prolegalization
experimentation at the state level. Lobbyists likely will concentrate their efforts on the federal
government because it is more efficient to lobby one legislature than fifty and there is little point to
legalization in the states if the same conduct is criminal under federal law. See Devins, supra note
178, at 1194 ("[A]s compared to lobbying fifty state legislatures, there are fewer transaction costs
associated with national legislation."); Marshall, supra note 114, at 146-47. For their part, state
legislators may wish to save their political powder for issues on which they can actually make a
difference: tangible benefits are needed in order to outweigh the potential costs of appearing soft on
crime. Thus, the breadth of federal criminal law may be somewhat self-sustaining.
180. See Stuntz, supra note 114, at 533.
181. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
182. See Brickey, supra note 56, at 1165; Curtis, supra note 108, at 95; see also Litman &
Greenberg, supra note 30, at 968 (describing how the San Antonio Independent School District
Police Department welcomed federal participation in a state-federal task force on the view that "the
threat of federal prosecution was a valuable tool for local law enforcement" and how the
Department "protested vehemently" when the U.S. Attorney's Office ceased bringing prosecutions
under the Gun Free School Zones Act after the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Lopez, 2
F.3d 1342 (1993)).
183. See Stuntz, supra note 114, at 538 ("Local prosecutors have too many cases and too little
time; anything that converts contested trials into guilty pleas is valuable to them.").
184. In a recent article on the politics of sentencing, Rachel Barkow explains that cost
constraints may force states to take a more level view of the costs and benefits of criminal
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such circumstances, the broader sweep of federal law provides no cause for
complaint and may well be a boon to state officials who would put offenders
behind bars if they could afford to do so.
To be sure, in some instances the difference between state and federal
law may reflect a real policy disagreement on the criminality of certain
conduct. But states' complaints about federal criminal law may well fall on
deaf ears.' 85 Federalism-based arguments do not resonate well with voters,
who tend to focus on political outcomes rather than the reasons for them.
1 86
Thus, states that are at the vanguard of a decriminalization movement, or are
resisting a push toward creating some new offense, likely will find it difficult
to sway federal legislators reluctant to appear soft on crime.
In sum, the political safeguards of federalism offer scant protection
against federal overreaching in the context of criminal law. In the rare
instances in which states oppose new federal enactments or desire a repeal of
existing prohibitions, any solicitude for the states likely will be overcome by
federal legislators' own powerful incentives to take a tough-on-crime stance.
Much more common is the situation in which federal law overlaps with state
law. In such circumstances, state representatives have little to no incentive to
oppose politically popular federal criminal enactments. If there is to be a
check against federal overreaching on crime control issues, therefore, it must
come from outside of ordinary politics.
B. Institutional Competence
The second argument for leaving questions of commerce largely to
Congress is based on comparative institutional competence. For nearly a
punishment than does the federal government. Barkow, supra note 111. The states have finite
resources: they have less money at their disposal than the federal government, and typically they
cannot engage in deficit spending. Id. at 1290. Moreover, the costs of law enforcement-most
notably incarceration-make up a large chunk of most states' budgets. Id. As a result, states have
an incentive to reduce sentences and experiment with alternative forms of punishment. Barkow
demonstrates that many states in fact have begun to do just that. Id. at 1285-90. Cost
considerations, it seems, can counteract the political pressure to be tough on crime. But see id. at
1301-02 (explaining that the federal government does not experience similar cost constraints).
185. That is especially true if the proposed solution is the repeal of existing law. As has been
well documented elsewhere, it is much easier to block congressional action than to compel it. See,
e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEXAS L.
REv. 705, 712, 715 (2002) (explaining that the Constitution makes it harder to enact legislation than
to block it because the demands of bicameralism and presentment to the President require
supermajoritarian consensus before new legislation can be enacted); McNollgast, Legislative Intent:
The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
& Spring 1994, at 3, 11 ("[A]ttempts to pass new legislation typically must navigate through
numerous veto gates before even reaching the presidential approval/veto stage: agreement must be
reached among House and Senate committees, the majority party leadership in both chambers,
majorities in both chambers, and the president.").
186. See Marshall, supra note 114, at 145 ("[I]t is politically damaging to oppose substantively
popular legislation on federalism grounds. Any congressman will tell you that she cannot get away
with arguing that a given piece of legislation should be defeated simply because Congress does not
have authority to enact it.").
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century, courts and commentators have championed judicial self-restraint on
Commerce Clause issues on the ground that legislators are better than judges
at understanding and resolving complex economic questions. 187  Given that
there is no reason to believe that courts are better suited than Congress to
find the "right" answer, the argument goes, the decision should be left to
democratically elected and accountable representatives rather than unelected
judges.'88
Like the political-safeguards argument considered above, the
institutional-capacity justification for judicial restraint rests heavily on a set
of claims about how institutions work-namely, that Congress is good at
finding the sorts of facts relevant to economic issues and courts are not.
Congress, it is said, "can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess
the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy."' 8 9
"The greater number of members and their varied backgrounds and
experience make it virtually certain that the typical legislature will command
wider knowledge and keener appreciation of current social and economic
conditions than will the typical court."' 190 Legislators, moreover, "have
substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to devote to effective
information gathering and sorting."' 9 ' Legislators can take years to study a
187. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) ("The nature of the judicial process
makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so
often involved in constitutional adjudication."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW 116-17 (1924) ("Some of the errors of courts have their origin in imperfect knowledge of the
economic and social consequences of a decision, or of the economic and social needs to which a
decision will respond."); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 143 ("The courts ... are not well-
suited to gather the evidence necessary to assess the magnitude of complex social practices ....").
188. See, e.g., Henry Wolf Bikl, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REv. 6, 7 (1924) (explaining that "the
layman may be quite ready to defer to the opinion of the court when the decision requires a
definition of the legal significance of the phrase 'ex post facto law,"' but not when "he knows of no
particular reason for supposing that judges are better able to decide [the relevant question] than
other intelligent persons"); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations,
40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 210 (1971) ("By hypothesis, judicial review is
countermajoritarian .... This may not be objectionable when the Court is giving effect to a fairly
absolute, enduring command rooted either in the words of the Constitution or in years of
constitutional tradition. It is objectionable where the Court is simply second-guessing the
legislature on some eclectic question .. "); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Verneule, Interpretation
and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 887 (2003) ("The high deference usually reflected in
'rationality review' represents a recognition that courts might misunderstand the facts, and that
when the facts are unclear, judgments of value should be made politically, not judicially.").
189. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994) ("As an
institution, ... Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic as that presented here." (quotation
marks omitted)).
190. Cox, supra note 188, at 209.
191. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 527, 578 (1994).
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given problem; 192 they can form special subcommittees to focus on particular
issues and develop the necessary expertise; 193 and they can hold hearings
across the country, call witnesses, requisition studies, and obtain expert
advice from various legislative support services. 1
94
Courts, by contrast, must look at problems one case at a time, which
may prevent them from taking an appropriately global view of a given
issue.1 95 They must rely on the information presented by the parties and their
amici or engage in their own independent inquiry. But the parties' data may
be skewed to support only one side of the dispute, 196 and courts typically lack
the resources-the time, the expertise, the sheer manpower-to collect and
digest vast amounts of extra-record data. 197
192. Devins, supra note 178, at 1179 ("Unconstrained by the need to decide a particular case at
a particular moment in time .... legislative committees may conduct hearings over a number of
months, even years, before acting.").
193. See Cox, supra note 188, at 209 ("The legislative committee, especially when armed with
able counsel and power of subpoena, is better equipped to develop the relevant data."); Saul M.
Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional
Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 363-65 (1984)
("Congress has been understood to have plenary power to investigate.... Repeated investigation of
a particular subject area often leads a committee or subcommittee to develop substantial expertise,
which may well be deferred to by the whole Congress when considering proposed legislation.").
194. See Devins, supra note 178, at 1179; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 117
("Congress educates itself not just through structured record evidence but through a range of
informal contacts-including local meetings with constituents, ex parte contacts between members
(or staff) and lobbyists, and exchanges with executive branch representatives."). The legislative
process also affords Congress substantial flexibility to deal with problems that might evolve over
time. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871 (2004) ("Judicial rulemaking is limited by strong
stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change quickly; in contrast, legislatures
enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new rules.").
195. See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 147-48 (1993) ("Courts are rarely
experts in the area at hand. Moreover, the focus on the litigated case makes it hard for judges to
understand the complex, often unpredictable effects of legal intervention. Knowledge of these
effects is crucial but sometimes inaccessible.").
196. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 188, at 209 ("A court may hear expert witnesses, but they are
seldom more than special pleaders. The customary reliance is upon the lawyer's brief ... ; but even
in skilled hands, it hardly equips a court to decide which side is right about a highly controversial
social or economic question-assuming that 'rightness' can be proved."); Kenneth L. Karst,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 105 (questioning whether
judges are capable of reaching wise decisions when parties' experts offer conflicting opinions).
197. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 188, at 209 ("Courts have always found it hard to develop the
background facts in constitutional cases. Judicial notice often means only intuition or prejudice.");
Peggy C. Davis, 'There Is a Book Out. . ': An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1595-98 (1987) (describing how extra-record literature can "infect[]
judicial decisionmaking"); David L. Faigman, "'Normative Constitutional Factfinding": Exploring
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 577-93
(critiquing cases in which the Supreme Court has misconstrued, misapplied, or ignored relevant
scientific and empirical data); Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1187, 1211-18 (1975) (discussing problems that arise when the Court relies on data that has
not been subjected to adversarial testing); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference,
Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1006 (1999) ("The review of facts is
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Implicit in the institutional critique of courts is an assumption that the
factual questions that need to be answered in cases involving the commerce
power are the sweeping sort that would benefit from time, expertise, and a
national perspective.198 That assumption makes sense when one considers
that the purpose of the institutional-capacity argument is to explain why
courts should not strike down Commerce Clause legislation simply because
they disagree with Congress's judgment about the connection between a
given activity and interstate'99 commerce. The argument, in other words, is
directed to how courts should behave in cases involving findings-based
statutes-cases in which the inquiry necessarily is pitched at a high level of
generality, involving the economic characteristics of a broad class of activity.
Given its focus, the institutional-capacity argument has very little
traction on the question at issue here: whether Congress ever should be
permitted to rely on its own findings, rather than providing for case-by-case
adjudication of the jurisdictional facts, when criminal punishment is at stake.
The argument tells us why we should prefer judicial deference to Congress
over some form of heightened scrutiny of findings-based statutes. It says
nothing about why we should prefer categorical congressional findings to
case-by-case adjudication by means of jurisdictional elements.
Indeed, the key insight of the institutional-capacity argument-that
heightened scrutiny of Commerce Clause enactments requires courts to
substitute their judgment for that of Congress on economic questions that
Congress is better suited to answer-is simply inapposite to the choice
between deferential review of findings-based statutes and case-by-case
adjudication by means of jurisdictional elements. Recall that Congress's
claimed institutional advantage is that it can look at economic issues
holistically whereas judges and juries see only one case at a time. Unlike
heightened scrutiny, case-by-case adjudication of jurisdictional elements
time-consuming. Unlike legislatures and agencies, judges do not have years to amass the huge
factual records.").
198. Notice, as well, the assumption that the only relevant factfmders are Congress and courts.
There is no place for the jury in the institutional-capacity story. The omission is important, as
adding the jury to the mix negates a key aspect of the argument-the claim about relative
democratic legitimacy. Congress should have the last word, we are told, because absent some
compelling reason to prefer judicial review, unelected judges should defer to the judgment of
elected legislators. That claim is weak to begin with. As the discussion in the previous subpart
makes clear, there is a compelling reason to prefer judicial review in this context: the politics of
crime control give federal legislators strong incentives to ignore the constitutional limits on their
power. But that is not the only problem. Federal legislators may be the people's representatives,
but jurors are "the people." See LEVINE, supra note 141, at 17 ("Elected officials may at times
reflect the will of the people, but their views are an indirect representation of current feelings. Jury
decision making, on the other hand, is literally the vox populi-the voice of the people. It is
populism in action."). Congress has no democratic advantage here.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616-18 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the majority's decision to strike down the Gun Free School School Zones Act on the
ground, inter alia, that a legislature is more likely than a court to decide accurately whether a
significant factual link exists between a given activity and interstate commerce).
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does not rule out a role for Congress's holistic judgment. Instead, it divides
the inquiry into a generalized question, reserved for Congress, and a
defendant-specific question to be answered by the jury.
Consider again the Hobbs Act, which prohibits robbery and extortion
that affects interstate commerce "in any way or any degree.,, 20 0  As noted
above, the Hobbs Act permits conviction on proof of a de minimis effect on
interstate commerce °.20  That meager requirement may at first blush seem
hard to square with the rule that Congress may regulate intrastate activities
202only if they have a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce. But the
Court long has held that Congress may legislate on the basis of the aggregate
effect of economic activities.20 3 The question of aggregation is different in
an important respect from the question posed by jurisdictional elements.
Jurisdictional elements ask, "did X activity affect interstate commerce in this
instance?" The answer to that question can change from case to case,
depending on the particular circumstances of the defendant's conduct: one
defendant's act of extortion may have an effect on interstate commerce while
another's may not. Aggregation, on the other hand, asks whether the
combined effects of every instance of commerce-affecting X are substantial
enough to warrant federal action. The answer to that question is not
defendant-specific and will not change from case to case. Consistent with
the nature of the inquiry, aggregation never has been the subject of a
jurisdictional element but instead has been left to Congress's judgment.2°
Given that jurisdictional elements leave the question of aggregation in
Congress's hands, it is hard to see why categorical findings-based
prohibitions offer any significant advantages over a case-by-case approach in
terms of Congress's ability to see the big picture. Jurisdictional elements and
findings-based statutes differ only with respect to the threshold question
whether activity X had some effect on interstate commerce in the individual
case-jurisdictional elements require a case-by-case assessment of whether
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
201. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
202. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
203. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205-07 (2005) (discussing Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
204. See supra note 137 (citing cases holding that the de minimis standard of the Hobbs Act
survives Lopez's emphasis on "substantial" in the substantial-effects test). Although the courts are
unanimous that the effect on commerce to be proved in each case need not be substantial, there is
some disagreement on the reason for that rule. Most courts have reasoned that Congress validly
may prohibit individual instances of robbery and extortion that have only a small effect on interstate
commerce so long as it rationally could conclude that the effects of such activities are substantial
when considered in the aggregate. The D.C. Circuit, however, has held that aggregation is
unnecessary when the class of conduct being regulated is confined (by means of a jurisdictional
element) to conduct that affects interstate commerce. See United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d
1460, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Where the nexus between a federal statute and interstate commerce
must be proved in each application of the statute, [the] 'aggregation' doctrine-which is designed to
extend the commerce power to cases in which the evidence specific to each individual case may be
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of an interstate nexus-is unnecessary.").
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the defendant's act X affected interstate commerce, whereas findings-based
statutes rest on Congress's judgment that every act X affects interstate
commerce. Why should Congress's national perspective give it an edge on
that threshold question? If anything, it would seem that Congress, which
necessarily acts on the basis of its understanding of the typical characteristics
and consequences of given activities rather than on particular facts about
particular cases, would be worse at identifying the commercial effects of an
individual defendant's actions than judges and juries, whose judgments are
based on individualized evidence. To be sure, in some cases the connection
between X and interstate commerce may be hard to see without a broader
understanding of the national economy. For example, it might not be evident
to the average lay person why a particular marketing policy has anti-
competitive effects, such that it falls within the prohibition of the antitrust
acts. 205 But if Congress has developed special expertise, there is no reason
why it cannot share its insight with federal prosecutors, who can then explain
the issue to judges and juries. 20 6
It should come as no surprise, then, that for all the ink that has been
spilled on the question of judicial competence to assess the economic effects
of particular activities, no significant concerns have been raised about the
capacity of courts and juries to cope with jurisdictional elements. Instead, it
appears that courts have had little trouble obtaining the necessary evidence
regarding the economic effects of the defendant's conduct and that juries
have been capable of understanding that evidence. Nor should their apparent
success be particularly startling. The question whether the defendant's
conduct affected interstate commerce is simply a question of causation, and
courts and juries consider such questions all the time. Causation may be
complicated at times, or it may touch on difficult economic or scientific
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37a (2000).
206. Consideration of Congress's incentives reveals another flaw in the institutional-capacity
claim. Factfinding capacity is irrelevant absent some assurance that the putative factfmder will
make a good faith effort to seek out and digest all the relevant information. See Devins, supra note
178, at 1182 (questioning whether "Congress has the incentives to take factfinding seriously");
Pilchen, supra note 193, at 362 ("While legislatures have unique structural capabilities for
conducting far-reaching investigations that are not possessed by courts, political pressures often
inhibit impartial evaluations of factual merits."). And there is reason to doubt that federal
legislators presented with a proposal for a new criminal prohibition will take advantage of the
services available to them and make a serious effort to determine whether the antisocial activity
under consideration has a sufficient connection to interstate commerce. Chances are that no one-
not the states, not the public, and certainly not prosecutors-will complain if Congress criminalizes
conduct that does not, in fact, have any effect on interstate commerce. On the flip side, any federal
legislator who opposes a popular crime bill on the ground that it exceeds the commerce power is
likely to catch substantial political heat. See Devins, supra note 178, at 1195 ("[V]oters expect
lawmakers to support politically popular legislation, not block it for a principle as abstract as
Congress's failure to show-through factfmding-that the measure addresses a national problem.");
see also supra text accompanying note 186. So, for the same reason that process safeguards are
insufficient to prevent federal overreaching in the context of criminal law, Congress's capacity for
factf'mding is insufficient to ensure a genuine search for the "right" answer to questions regarding
the interstate commerce nexus.
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issues. But there is nothing in the nature of the "affects commerce" inquiry
that differentiates it as a categorical matter from other hard questions.
Of course, case-by-case adjudication of jurisdictional elements may
result in some false negatives even if juries are capable of understanding the
factual questions involved. That alone cannot justify a move to findings-
based criminals statutes, however. As explained in Part II, the constitutional
requirements that govern criminal prosecutions are grounded on the view that
"it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free., 20 7 They embody a fundamental value judgment that when criminal
punishment is on the line it is better to be underinclusive than overinclusive.
To that end, the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial requirements minimize the
risk of error in only one direction-in favor of the defendant and against
criminal punishment.20 8 Application of such asymmetrical requirements to
any set of facts necessarily increases risk of error in the other direction. That
may fairly be identified as a cost of the procedural protections governing
criminal prosecutions, but it is a cost that the Constitution itself requires.
VI. Toward a Defendant-Specific Approach to Criminal Commerce Clause
Legislation
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress's decision
about how to draft a criminal prohibition has significant consequences for
criminal defendants-and, as a practical matter, for the scope of federal law.
Given the differences between a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and a requirement of mere rationality, and between a defendant-
specific inquiry and one addressed to a broad range of conduct, the move
from jurisdictional elements to findings results in losses in accuracy in the
individual case. Moreover, by drafting a statute to omit a jurisdictional
element, Congress writes the jury out of the picture, thereby reducing a
critical check on governmental overreaching and removing a distinctly local
voice from the decisionmaking process.
Those costs are not counterbalanced by the asserted benefits of leaving
questions of commerce largely to Congress's discretion. It may be more
efficient for Congress to rely on its own categorical judgment rather than
requiring federal prosecutors to prove a connection to commerce in each
case, but efficiency concerns have never been permitted to trump the
requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and presentation to a
jury.2°9 The overlapping set of constitutional protections that applies to
criminal prosecutions is designed not to promote efficiency but to create
speed bumps on the route to the jailhouse door. If application of those
207. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
208. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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protections to the facts that provide the basis for federal punishment results
in fewer federal prosecutions, that is hardly reason to abandon the effort.
Findings-based statutes also may permit the federal government to reach
conduct whose effects on commerce may be difficult to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt (or may be difficult to discover without the investigative
authority made possible by a broad prohibition). 210 But the same could be
said of any mechanism that allows the government to avoid the asymmetrical
risk of error created by application of the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
requirements.21' If the government's interest in convicting the "guilty" were
sufficient to overcome the values of the procedural protections governing
criminal prosecutions, those rules would be a dead letter. In order to justify
permitting Congress to avoid the requirements of proof and jury presentation
for the facts that establish the basis for federal power under the Commerce
Clause, therefore, it is not enough to say that case-by-case adjudication by
means of jurisdictional elements may let some commerce-affecting behavior
slip through the cracks. Instead, one must explain why the
underinclusiveness that follows from those protective measures is
particularly intolerable in the Commerce Clause context (more so than, say,
in prosecutions of suspected serial killers). In light of the facts that
jurisdictional elements still leave room for the expertise Congress may gain
from its ability to look at issues holistically, that most federal offenses are
punishable under state law as well, and that Congress remains free to
legislate broadly by civil means, any such argument would be dubious at
best.
The argument for findings-based statutes becomes weaker still when
one considers the political dynamics behind criminal Commerce Clause
legislation. The degree to which the political process is skewed in favor of
tough-on-crime measures creates a significant risk that federal criminal
legislation will sweep too broadly. The need for a check from outside
normal politics is correspondingly strong.
In sum, then, categorical findings-based criminal prohibitions offer little
to commend and much to condemn. Deference to congressional findings
may be appropriate in civil cases because of the very different interests at
stake, but courts should abandon that lenient approach in the criminal
210. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (describing federal prosecutors'
complaints about early gambling statutes).
211. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975) ("It has been suggested that because of
the difficulties in negating an argument that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion the
burden of proving this fact should rest on the defendant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for
the prosecution to satisfy. The same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of many controverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the traditional burden which our
system of criminal justice deems essential." (citations omitted)); Wiley, supra note 125, at 1084
("All strictures on prosecutors 'obstruct' prosecutorial efficiency-the reasonable doubt standard,
the rules of evidence, the Bill of Rights, and so forth. Of course prosecutors could work more
efficiently without rules. So what?").
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context.212 The federal government should not be permitted to impose
criminal punishment on individuals absent proof in each case of the factual
predicate for federal action. Instead, Congress should be required to include
jurisdictional elements in any future criminal prohibitions, 213 and-in order
to safeguard the defendant's Due Process and Sixth. Amendment rights to
adequate proof of the facts that are "necessary to constitute the
crime ... charged" 2 14-- courts should interpret existing findings-based
statutes to require a jurisdictional showing.215
The connection to interstate commerce that must be proved in each case
need not be substantial. As explained above, the Court long has held that
Congress may legislate on the basis of the aggregate effects of economic
activities, and the quantitative question of aggregation has never been the
subject of a jurisdictional element.216 The question for the jury in the
individual case is simply whether the defendant's conduct had some effect on
interstate commerce. That standard is easily satisfied in any case that
plausibly falls within an area of federal concern. Yet as courts repeatedly
have recognized in cases involving "affect[s] commerce" jurisdictional
elements, there is a tangible difference between something and nothing.217
For criminal defendants, it is the difference between conviction and acquittal.
212. Cf Dorf, supra note 70, at 64-65 (suggesting that the "Court might turn to its rights
jurisprudence as a supplement to its federalism jurisprudence," taking a more limited view of the
commerce power where individual rights are at stake).
213. The approach suggested in the text is not a plain-statement rule. If Congress were to enact
a findings-based statute that specifically provided that there must not be any proof in the individual
case of the connection between the defendant's conduct and interstate commerce, such a statute
would be unconstitutional on the same ground as a statute that provided that a connection to
commerce must be proved to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text (explaining why the proposed federal code reform would have been
unconstitutional).
214. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
215. Cf United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
federal child pornography statute cannot constitutionally be applied to intrastate possession of
noncommercial pornography absent some showing that such possession affected interstate
commerce and observing that "[t]he fact that the Constitution might require showings that a statute
does not is no anomaly, but is instead an indispensable ingredient in the recipe for any statute that is
facially valid but invalid as applied in particular cases"); United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672,
687-88 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing the need to "avoid constitutional concerns" in construing the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666, to require proof of a nexus to federal funds), abrogated by United
States v. Sabri, 541 U.S. 600 (2004); United States v. Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (also
requiring a nexus between federal funds and payments received by the defendant), abrogated by
Sabri, 541 U.S. 600; United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 could be constitutionally applied if the government charged
and proved a connection to commerce and explaining that "[aln indictment that fails to allege a
commerce nexus, where such a nexus is a necessary element of the offense, is defective" and that
"[t]his is true even though the language of [the statute] contains no such requirement" (citing
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-66 (1962); and 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 19.2, at 452 (1984))).
216. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
217. See cases cited supra notes 67 and 138. The point also is illustrated by the handful of
cases in which courts have sustained as-applied challenges to findings-based Commerce Clause
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Of course, some criminal statutes contain jurisdictional elements that
create an evidentiary burden so slight as to be functionally meaningless. An
example is the child pornography statute, which prohibits the knowing
possession of materials that contain any visual depiction of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct "that has been mailed, or shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or
that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or
transported, by any means including by computer .... ,218 As several courts
have acknowledged, the requirement that the visual depiction in question be
produced using materials that have traveled in interstate commerce at some
point in time is no requirement at all: it is virtually impossible to imagine a
case in which it will not be satisfied. 19
statutes on the ground that the defendant's conduct, while within the class of conduct described by
the statutory text, does not have any plausible connection to interstate commerce. See United States
v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1322 (11 th Cir. 2005) (holding that the child pornography statute cannot
constitutionally be applied to intrastate, noneconomic activity); Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1067-68
(refusing to sustain the application of the federal child pornography statute to a defendant whose
activity was noneconomic and noncommercial); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) unconstitutional as applied to the simple possession of a
machinegun made with parts transported in interstate commerce), petition for cert. granted, decision
vacated in light of Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d
1114, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the federal child pornography statute cannot
constitutionally be applied to "simple intrastate possession of home-grown child pornography not
intended for distribution or exchange"); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 326, 333 (6th Cir.
2001) (striking down a conviction for possession of child pornography when the minor pictured in
offending materials was the 23-year-old defendant's 17-year-old girlfriend and there was no
evidence that the defendant had any other sexual involvement with minors). The concerns driving
those decisions are valid ones. But, as other courts have recognized, the as-applied decisions are
hard to square with the prevailing rule that "[w]hen Congress regulates a class of activities that
substantially affects interstate commerce, a defendant's claim that his personal activities did not
affect interstate commerce fails if his activity is within that class." United States v. Morales-de
Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir.
2003) (rejecting an as-applied challenge to a conviction for production of child pornography under
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) on the ground that, "when Congress regulates a class of activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce, ... the nexus to interstate commerce.., is determined by
the class of activities regulated by the statute as a whole, not by the simple act for which an
individual defendant is convicted" (quotation marks and alterations omitted)); McCoy, 323 F.3d at
1137 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("[T]he resolution of this case boils down to whether the statute under
review .... which encompasses a certain kind of intrastate possession, passes Commerce Clause
muster, not whether [the defendant's] categorically peculiar circumstances have a pellucid nexus to
interstate commerce.").
218. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(4)(B) (2004).
219. See Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1063 (holding that the jurisdictional element in the child
pornography statute is "patently insufficient to ensure the statute's constitutional application");
McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1126 (recognizing that the jurisdictional element is "useless" and "provides no
support for the government's assertion of federal jurisdiction"); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d
465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that "[a] jurisdictional element is only sufficient to ensure a
statute's constitutionality when the element either limits the regulation to interstate activity or
ensures that the intrastate activity to be regulated falls within one of the three categories of
congressional power" and upholding the child pornography statute on a "substantial effects" theory,
not on the basis of the phantom jurisdictional element); accord Corp, 236 F.3d at 330-31; United
States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 337 (7th
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It is important to recognize, however, that such "phantom" jurisdictional
elements-elements that do nothing to restrict the scope of the statute-are
by no means inevitable. To the contrary, they are linked in an important
respect to Congress's assumed power to prohibit conduct on the basis of its
own findings. Consider the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Scarborough, in which the Court held that the "affect[s] commerce" element
of the federal felon-in-possession statute220 may be satisfied by proof that the
firearm in question had traveled in interstate commerce at some point in
time.221 Scarborough often is invoked as authority for the proposition that
"once moved in commerce" jurisdictional elements are sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Commerce Clause.2  But nothing in the Court's
opinion suggests that evidence of past movement in commerce actually
establishes a constitutionally meaningful (much less sufficient) effect on
commerce. Instead, the Court's decision in Scarborough rested heavily on
Congress's findings regarding the effects of firearm possession on interstate
commerce. 223  The Court's permissive interpretation of the jurisdictional
element, therefore, was influenced by the fact that the element did not have
to do all the work: the constitutionality of the prohibition could be tested in
light of the facts to be proved at trial plus the facts found by Congress
224
regarding the commercial effects of firearm possession.
Take away the overlay of congressional findings, and phantom
jurisdictional elements look much different. Under the case-by-case
approach proposed here, the predicate for federal action would have to be
established by the evidence presented at trial; that evidence no longer could
be supplemented by background findings regarding the typical commercial
effects of the conduct in question. Such an approach would force courts to
take a harder look at whether proof of the jurisdictional facts identified in the
statute would be sufficient, without more, to bring the defendant's conduct
Cir. 2000). But see United States v. Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
jurisdictional element is an independently sufficient basis on which to sustain the constitutionality
of the child pornography statute); United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998)
(same).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person... who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.").
221. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
222. See, e.g., Litman & Greenberg, supra note 30, at 932-33.
223. See 431 U.S. at 571 (noting that Congress found that possession of firearms by felons
"constitutes ... a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce" (quotation
marks omitted)). Indeed, the Court recognized that "the purpose of [the statute] was to proscribe
mere possession" and that Congress had included a jurisdictional element out of an abundance of
caution rather than an intent to limit the reach of the statute. Id. at 575.
224. In approving the jurisdictional element in the child pornography statute, the First Circuit
likewise relied on Congress's findings regarding the effects of child pornography possession on
interstate commerce. See Robinson, 137 F.3d at 655-56.
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within the scope of the commerce power. 25 The answer is easy when the
statute in question demands proof that the defendant did something
"affecting commerce"; it is far less clear when all that is required is evidence
that the defendant possessed something created from materials that once
moved in interstate commerce.226 I do not purport to predict how courts
would resolve the inquiry for the many different jurisdictional elements in
federal criminal statutes, but it seems safe to say that the phantom elements
that survive scrutiny under current law would not fare as well under the
approach I suggest.
Finally, it bears emphasis that the benefits of case-by-case proof of the
connection between criminal conduct and interstate commerce reach beyond
individual defendants. Although my focus has been on the individual rights
implications of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the far more
common complaint is a structural one grounded on concerns about the
federal-state balance. The two conceptions are not mutually exclusive. By
eliminating procedural protections designed to minimize the risk of
erroneous federal convictions, current law also eliminates a potent protection
against federal overreaching. And by restoring the protections of the
reasonable-doubt and jury-trial guarantees to criminal prosecutions under the
Commerce Clause, the approach I propose serves both individual and
structural interests.
Those who believe in the need for a check on federal overreaching in
order to protect the values of federalism typically advocate some form of
heightened judicial scrutiny of Commerce Clause legislation, such as that
employed in United States v. Lopez.227  As compared to case-by-case
adjudication of jurisdictional elements, however, heightened scrutiny has
several disadvantages. Heightened scrutiny pitches the battle over federal
power at the highest level of generality, pitting the wisdom of federal judges
against that of Congress on the question whether a broad class of conduct is
225. The question for the court, in other words, would be whether the jurisdictional element is
sufficient to "ensure, through case-by-case inquiry," that the activity in question has "an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce"-that is, that the defendant's conduct falls within
Congress's power under the channels, instrumentalities, or substantial effects categories. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
226. My own view is that the jurisdictional element in the child pornography statute is
constitutionally insufficient. Given its reference to interstate movement, the statute may appear to
be a "channels" regulation. It is not. A true channels statute actually regulates (or prohibits) the
movement of something or someone across state lines. By definition, then, it can be enforced at the
point of such movement, or at least shortly thereafter. The child pornography statute is quite
different. It regulates conduct that occurs well after the material moves interstate, conduct that
could not possibly be anticipated-and therefore could not be regulated-when the material actually
travels in the channels of interstate commerce. Nor does the movement of some material-film
paper, for example, or ink-establish that the defendant's possession of child pornography has any
meaningful effect on interstate commerce.
227. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 4; McGinnis & Somen, supra note
176; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEXAS L. REv. 1459 (2001); Yoo, supra note 31.
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adequately connected to interstate commerce-or, as the Court put it in
Lopez, whether the activity in question is "economic. 228 By requiring judges
to analyze the relationship between the entire class of regulated conduct and
the national economy rather than focusing the inquiry on a particular
individual or set of individuals, the heightened-scrutiny approach opens itself
up to complaints about relative institutional competence. Heightened
scrutiny also amplifies concerns about the countermajoritarian nature of
judicial review by obliging unelected judges to substitute their judgment for
that of federal legislators on debatable economic questions.
Jurisdictional elements avoid those problems by mandating a defendant-
specific inquiry that fits comfortably within the ken of judges and jurors and
is easily distinguished from the sort of inquiry Congress typically undertakes.
Moreover, while cases like Lopez treat the question whether the activity at
issue is "economic" as a pure question of law on which courts have the final
say, 229 case-by-case adjudication of jurisdictional elements recognizes that an
assessment of economic effects has elements of both fact-finding and law-
application. Like other mixed questions, the question whether an
individual's conduct affected interstate commerce inevitably will be resolved
in different ways in different circumstances depending on the identity of the
decisionmaker and the particular facts of the case. Jurisdictional elements
vest primary decisionmaking authority in the jury, giving the local
community a direct voice in the process.
Perhaps most important, jurisdictional elements create an opportunity
for an ongoing dialogue among jurors, judges, and Congress about the proper
subjects of federal action. When a statute contains a jurisdictional element,
the constitutional question of what sorts of commercial connections are
enough to bring an activity within the scope of the commerce power is
transformed into a question of statutory interpretation and application. To be
sure, jurisdictional elements must be interpreted in the shadow of the
Constitution: when determining what it takes to satisfy an "affects
commerce" element, for example, courts must take account of the
constitutional limits on Congress's legislative authority. Nevertheless,
through the development and review of jury instructions, judgments on the
sufficiency of the evidence, debates about the proper interpretation of
jurisdictional elements, and so on, the case-by-case approach makes room for
a more fine-grained, and less final, inquiry into the boundaries of federal
power.
VII. Conclusion
The constitutional requirements of trial by jury and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt serve to protect criminal defendants against unwarranted
228. See supra note 46.
229. See id.
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criminal punishment and to ensure that the determination of guilt is made by
a local jury rather than an officer of the federal government. The purposes of
those protections apply with full force to aspects of the offense that are
jurisdictional in nature. Yet current Commerce Clause doctrine permits
Congress to avoid application of the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial
requirements simply by drafting criminal prohibitions in a certain way. That
doctrine lacks any compelling justification. It is a consequence of courts'
longstanding failure to recognize that findings-based statutes not only raise
questions of federalism but also implicate questions of individual rights-and
their related failure to distinguish between civil regulations and criminal
prohibitions. Attention to the distinctive features of criminal law and to the
values served by the reasonable-doubt and jury-trial requirements reveals the
need for a new approach to criminal Commerce Clause statutes, under which
the basis for federal jurisdiction must be proved to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt in each case.
